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I. Introduction
"Sorry seems to be the hardest word," said Elton John. And if it
is hard enough to admit one's mistakes in front of a single person, as
Sir Elton tried to do but was unable to, it must be immeasurably
harder to do so in front of dozens of millions of people. Hence, it is
no wonder that the press is often reluctant to publicize the fact that a
story it had previously published on a person has turned out to be
false. This understandable human behavior of the flesh-and-blood
people who form the abstract entity called "the press" gives no
comfort, however, to a defamed person whose reputation is unjustly
destroyed. Should a publisher, therefore, be obliged to state publicly
that a report he had made is false? May he be forced to?
A retraction is a withdrawal of the defamatory charge, or at least
part of it, by the speaker (as opposed to only stating that the victim
denies it).' Retraction, it has been argued, is a highly efficient way to
settle disputes between the media and the subjects of false
defamatory reports, which is preferable to the remedy most
commonly used in tort law, namely, a damages award. This is so
mainly because such a solution avoids the oft debated theoretical
problem of the incommensurability of noneconomic losses, such as
reputational harm, to money.2 On the more practical side, the
retraction's advantage over damages may be attributed to the fact
that defamation litigation is distinguishable from other kinds of tort
2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION at 9-48.1. (2d ed. 1999).
2. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE
L.J. 56 (1993); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., FundamentalProperty Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555,
586-587 (1997); Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the
Constitutionalismof Means, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 289, 318-326 (1999); Robert L. Rabin,
Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 365 (2006).
1.
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actions, mainly personal injury, in two aspects. First, though bodily
harm such as a disease, a cut off organ or a handicap cannot be truly
measured in monetary terms, the law has developed methods to
translate it into several defined damage categories, some of which are
fairly quantifiable, such as medical expenses, and impairment of
earning capacity. In contrast, it is hard to think of parallel efficient
techniques of measuring reputational harm,3 because it is usually
confined to the realm of people's minds and often has no concrete
identifiable consequences in the objective reality.! Second, this
problematic "trade-off" of a concrete damage for a sum of money is
less inevitable in libel law.' Precisely the fact that the damage is not
physical is what makes it more reversible. A retraction, if it reaches a
big enough audience, is arguably the best device for restoring the
victim's reputation;6 it is certainly more effective in this respect than
money compensation. Therefore, it has a chance of getting closer than
any other remedy in nearly any other tort action to accomplishing the
utopian goal of "restitutio in integrum" (complete restitution).
The concept of retraction is not meaningless in the American
defamation law. At common law, voluntary retraction could be taken
into account by the jury as a consideration for reducing the damages.7
It has also been recognized as evidence of an absence of malice.8
Additionally, nowadays defamation statues in more than half of the
states prescribe that a retraction properly performed by the publisher
bars the victim from suing or from recovering certain types of
damages (e.g., general or punitive). 9 Yet, the traditional approach of

3.

John L. Diamond, Rethinking Media Liability for Defamation of Public Figures,5

CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 289, 300 (1996); James H. Hulme, Vindicating Reputation:
an Alternative to Damages as a Remedy for Defamation, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 375, 380

(1981); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 772, 832 (1985); 2 SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 9-58.1.
4. An exception might be when a person loses her job as a result of a defamatory
publication.
5. See Pierre N. Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its
Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1287, 1292 (1988).
6. Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1730, 1739

(1967)

[hereinafter

Vindication of Reputation]; THE ANNENBERG

WASHINGTON

PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAW, Preamble, and analysis of

Section 3 (1988) (the text of the proposal may be found in 2 SMOLLA, supra note 1, at pp.
9-70 - 9-91) [hereinafter THE ANNENBERG PROPOSAL].
7.

2 SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 9-49.

8. Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987).
9. 2 SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 9-49-9-55; Cal. Civ. Code § 48a (West, 1982); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-237 (West, 1960); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 770.02 (West Supp., 1984); Mass.
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the Anglo-American courts, recognizing damage awards as the
principal remedy for plaintiffs, has not changed. Despite the fact that
the "carrot and stick" provided by the said retraction statutes may
influence the publishers' discretion and provide them with substantial
incentives to retract, the choice is still theirs to make. The aim of
these statutes is, essentially, to protect their interests by allowing
them to evade the risk of monetary liability.
The analysis of a rule that obliges publishers to retract false
statements under certain circumstances is inherently different. The
crucial question raised by the issue of mandatory retraction, which is
absent (or at least almost absent) from the discussion of voluntary
retraction, is whether such a norm would coincide with the concepts
of the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press that are firmly
protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
One could say that mandatory retraction has been almost
entirely off the agenda of the American law. Only rarely has the
desirability of a mandatory retraction rule been recognized or even
considered. Because those courts that have dealt with that issue have
concluded that there is no such norm in the existing law, none of them
has examined in ratio decidendi its potential constitutionality. The
references to this topic in the legal literature have also been quite
scarce. It seems that at least following the 1974 Supreme Court
decision in Miami Herald v. Tornillo,'° which handled the related
issue of the right of reply, there has been a common belief, an axiom
perhaps, that should mandatory retraction ever be put on the table, it
would surely be invalidated. While there are some good reasons for
drawing this conclusion, as will be explained below, this article wishes
to question the correctness of the mentioned assumption and to argue
that under certain circumstances, and when it takes a certain form,
mandatory retraction could be compatible with the First Amendment.
The article will refer only to a case in which the defamed person
is a public figure and the publisher belongs to the media, a situation in
which the balance between the right of reputation and the freedom of
expression is most saliently in favor of the latter. In light of this
speech-protective approach that significantly harms reputation, which
goes back to the New York Times v. Sullivan decision," enhancing the

Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 93 (Michie/Law Co-op., 1974); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 548.06 (West,
1947).
10. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
11. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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protection of reputation is mostly important in that realm.12 It is the
public plaintiff's lack of a real chance of recovering damages that calls
upon considering the adoption of a mandatory retraction rule. As
private plaintiffs not subject to Sullivan are generally better situated,
this argument loses its relevance in their case. Furthermore, the
societal interest of ensuring the accuracy of the information available
in the public domain is at its peak when public figures are concerned,
while it is less crucial with regard to private people. Hence, the case
of a private plaintiff involves different considerations, which exceed
the scope of this research.
The first section of this article shall examine whether mandatory
retraction is recognized as unconstitutional under the positive law.
As the law does not provide a decisive answer to this question, the
second and third sections will proceed to analyze the various
considerations pertinent to the potential constitutionality of such a
rule. The fourth section shall then try to portray, in light of the
preceding discussion, the guidelines for shaping a mandatory
retraction settlement that might coincide with the existing First
Amendment doctrine. Given the weight of the arguments in favor of
mandatory retraction, this article will assert that drafting such a rule is
not only plausible but is also desirable. Thus, the article's operative
proposal will be empowering the courts to grant a new remedy in libel
actions, namely, a declaratory relief stating that the falsity of the
defaming publication has been established by clear and convincing
proof, accompanied by an injunction ordering the defendant to report
on that decision in a prominent manner. Such a remedy would be
granted irrespectively of the defendant's state of mind prior to the
publication.
II. Trying to Define the Existing Law
A. General
The question of the constitutionality of mandatory retraction has
seldom been directly addressed by the courts. The reason is simply
that there has probably never been such a rule in the American law.
On several occasions, courts refused to recognize the existence of an

12. While the suitability of mandatory retraction to various specific kinds of media
will be discussed separately, this article does not wish to articulate an exhaustive definition
of the term "media." Rather, it asserts that the application of mandatory retraction should
be considered in respect of any means of communications that is, or that will be, subjected
by the courts to the Sullivan ruling.
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independent cause of action for failure to retract in state laws. 13 In
two of these decisions, the courts noted that retraction is not
mandatory in any American jurisdiction; 14 this contention finds
support also in the legal literature.15 Hence, the discussion of the
constitutionality of mandatory retraction is currently entirely
theoretical.
The closest analogy to our context can be drawn from the
discussion regarding a "right of reply" to a defamatory publication.
The two issues arguably raise a similar constitutional problem,
namely, the intrusion into the editorial autonomy of the press."
Under both a right of reply and mandatory retraction rules, a
newspaper, for example, would be compelled to include in one of its
issues a publication of certain substance; in the former case it would
be a response written by the defamed person, whereas in the latter it
would be a correcting report on behalf of the newspaper itself.
The constitutionality of a right of reply statute has been the
subject of the cornerstone Tornillo ruling. 7 In that case, the Supreme
Court examined a Florida statute which provided that if a candidate
for nomination or election is assailed by a newspaper, the candidate
has the right to demand that the newspaper print, free of cost, any
reply she may make to the charges. The reply must appear in as
conspicuous a place as the charges which prompted the reply. Failure
to comply with the statute constituted a misdemeanor. The Florida
Supreme Court's holding that the statute did not violate
constitutional guarantees was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court held that the statute constituted a grave
interference with the newspapers' editorial autonomy protected by
the First Amendment.
Arguably, a rather easy way may be found to circumvent
Tornillo and legitimize mandatory retraction and even a right a reply
in many contexts, by asserting that the ruling is only applicable to the
print media. Support for this view may be implied primarily by the
8
Supreme Court decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.1
At
13. Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 680 (3rd Cir. 1991); Coughlin v. Westinghouse
Broad. and Cable, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Kaplan v. Newsweek, 10 Med.
L. Rptr. 2142 (N.D. Ca. 1984); Beasley v. Hearst Corp., 11 Med. L. Rptr. 2067 (Ca. Super.
Ct., 1985); Hulme, supra note 3, at 388.
14. Kramer, 947 F.2d at 680; Coughlin, 689 F. Supp. at 490.
15. 2 SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 9-49-9-55, at 9-64.
16. The concept of editorial autonomy will be discussed in detail in Section III(b)(ii),
infra.
17. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
18. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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stake there was the "fairness doctrine" applied to the broadcast
media by the Federal Communications Commission by virtue of the
Communications Act, which empowers it to allocate communications
frequencies, license broadcasters and monitor their activities.'9 The
fairness doctrine provides, inter alia, that a person or a group whose
honesty or character is attacked during a broadcast about a
controversial issue of public importance is allowed to respond over
the broadcasting station ("the personal attack rule"). 0 Upholding the
FCC regulations, the Court reasoned that they were not inconsistent
with the First Amendment goal of preserving "an uninhibited
2
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." '
Interestingly enough, the Tornillo decision, which came only five
years later, did not even cite Red Lion. That omission, which no one
contends to be accidental, opened the door to extensive discussion as
to the relationship between the two decisions. A common opinion is
that the Tornillo ruling, as aforementioned, was limited to print
media.2 Its lack of reference to Red Lion was attributed to "the
Court's continuing recognition of the distinction between the two
media, which is primarily manifested in the unique responsibilities of
broadcasters as public trustees. 2 3 The accepted need for a
government role in the allocation of broadcast frequencies, it is
asserted, has no analogue in the newspaper industry. 4 On the other
hand, it is hard to find in Tornillo any support for the contention that
the Court wished to limit its ruling to the print media. Thus, Professor
Benno Schmidt argued that despite the inherent differences between
the print and the broadcast media that must influence the
implementation of the norms, Tornillo's underlying principles have
force in the law of broadcasting as well.25
This article will assume that Red Lion is not good law anymore,
and will not rely on it in an attempt to legitimize mandatory
retraction with regard to the broadcast media. The fairness doctrine,
as it is commonly thought, is nowadays under a "constitutional
19. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399b (2000).
20. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(a) (2006).
21. Red Lion Broad. Co, 395 U.S. at 390.
22. United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union v. Parsons, 305 S.E.2d 343, 358 (W. Va.
1983).
23. NBC, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1193-94 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Tamm, J., dissenting),
cert. denied 424 U.S. 910 (1976).
24. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REV. 41, 177 (1974) [hereinafter
1973 Term].
25. BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS at 243-44
(Praeger 1976).
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cloud."26 This situation is attributable, apart from the Tornillo
decision itself, to the penetrating public and academic criticism that
the doctrine has been subject to, focusing to a great extent on the fact
that it provides an administrative body appointed by politicians with
wide discretionary powers to regulate speech.27 As a consequence of
the critique, the FCC has essentially abandoned the doctrine. 8
Furthermore, in 2000 a D.C. Circuit Court ordered the FCC to repeal
the personal attack rule.2 9 Hence, since the status of Red Lion is
unclear, to say the least, the starting point to the discussion should be
the least favorable to this article's thesis, namely, that Tornillo applies
to all media.
However, the contention that Tornillo controls the issue of
mandatory retraction at all, with regard to any kind of media, is
questionable. A deep inquiry into the Tornillo decision, the particular
facts of that case, and its surrounding circumstances, as well as an
assessment of the dissimilarities between a right of reply and
mandatory retraction, may lead to the conclusion that Tornillo does
not preclude the possibility of enacting mandatory retraction statutes.
B. The Intended Applicability of Tornillo to Mandatory Retraction
An attempt to determine whether Tornillo applies to mandatory
retraction ought to begin, naturally, by examining the decision itself.
Though the majority's opinion does not refer expressly to the said
question, an important insight is to be found in the concurring
opinion. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Rehnquist, concurred with
Justice Burger, who delivered the opinion of the Court, only insofar
as the opinion applied to right of reply statutes. The decision, as they
understood it, "implies no view upon the constitutionality of
'retraction' statutes affording plaintiffs able to prove defamatory
falsehoods a statutory action to require publication of a retraction."3 °
There is no indication that the majority accepted the
interpretation of their own opinion proposed by Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist. A plain reading of the majority opinion seems to suggest
that it intended to create an absolute First Amendment rule
prohibiting compelled publications of any kind. Nevertheless, the fact
that the majority refrained from addressing the issue of retraction

26. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 790 (1987).
27. Diamond, supra note 3, at 296.
28. Bruce W. Sanford, Libel and Privacy (New York, 2nd ed., 1991), at 598-604.
29. Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
30. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974).
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could imply that they wished to leave it unresolved. The difficulty of
fully understanding the Court's position stems also from the fact that
the decision provides theoretical analysis at a very abstract and
general level and is rather concise, which has subjected it to academic
criticism." In fact, even some of its defenders do not disagree that the
decision is uniquely laconic, although they claim that its lack of a
thorough discussion demonstrates the obviousness of the case's
outcome in the Court's view. 32
The vagueness of Tornillo in respect of its intended applicability
opened the door to various speculations. The attorney and scholar
Floyd Abrams, for example, believed that the Court's strong
emphasis on the risks of judicial dictation of what may be published
makes it unlikely that it did not intend for the decision to apply to
mandatory retraction.33 On the other hand, opposing views have been
voiced. The constitutionality of mandatory retraction was discussed in
dictum by the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
in Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broadcastingand Cable.34 In his decision,
Judge Pollak attached weight to Justice Brennan's remark in Tornillo:
"This careful reservation by the author of New York Times v.
Sullivan, leads me to conclude that the constitutionality of retraction
statutes is an entirely open issue, not prejudiced by the determination
in Miami at all. My view of the matter is that a carefully crafted
retraction statute could well be constitutional."35 Support for this
stand is also found in the legal literature. It was contended that an
interpretation of Tornillo which makes compulsory access only
presumptively unconstitutional could permit retraction statutes to be
upheld if the important state interest in promoting the vindication of
personal reputation were deemed sufficiently compelling.36 A similar
view was expressed by Schmidt. The explanation provided by him of
Tornillo's seemingly absolutist language is that the Court intended to
establish-in this first case involving access to a newspaper-a
general principle that the First Amendment contains a guarantee for
publisher autonomy that is infringed upon by access obligations; the
task of defining the scope of the protection and determining whether
31.

RANDALL P. BEZANSON, How FREE CAN THE PRESS BE? 251 (2003); SCHMIDT,

supra note 25, at 219.
32. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 281-82 (1991).

33.
34.
1988).
35.
36.

THE CONSTITUTION

-

Floyd Abrams, In Defense of Tornillo, 86 YALE L.J. 361, 366 n.35 (1976).
Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. and Cable, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.
Id. at 489.
1973 Term, supra note 24, at 179-80.
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it could be surmounted by particular social objectives was left for
later cases. 3 7 Thus, he asserted, specific access guarantees, designed to
implement particular and weighty social objectives with the least
possible jeopardy to editorial autonomy, may be upheld.38
Schmidt supplements his positivistic discussion of Tornillo with a
quasi-realistic analysis, offering a unique perspective of the decision
and the occurrences behind its scenes that might explain the
supposedly broad scope of its holding. He first notes that the Florida
courts had completely ignored the facts of the case and had
considered only the constitutionality of the statute in the most
abstract and sweeping terms. Consequently, the type of analysis made
by the Supreme Court was similar. The lack of appraisal of the
concrete facts prevented the possibility of producing a judgment
based on narrower grounds. 9 Schmidt adds that due to the fact that
the plaintiff was represented by the leading academic proponent of
imposing access obligations on the media-Professor Jerome
Barron-the case "took on the dimensions of a wholesale test of
Barron's access theories. ' Another factor which played a role,
according to Schmidt, was the severe time pressure under which the
Court was placed. The Miami Herald appeal was filed very close to
the end of the Court's term, and in addition to the usual end-ofseason rush, the Court was pressured by the upcoming appeal of
President Nixon in the Watergate tapes case. It is also for this reason,
it is alleged, that the Court chose to address the problem of access in
a general and truncated fashion."x Although these anecdotes are far
from being decisive, and arguably reflect an uncommon method of
legal analysis, they may serve as a modest support for the view that
Tornillo is to be construed more narrowly than its literal reading
would suggest.
C.

Right of Reply v. Mandatory Retraction

While the foregoing observations, which purport to trace the
general conceptions underlying Tornillo, are helpful for our purposes,
it would be of greater importance to conduct a comparison of a right
of reply and mandatory retraction from a constitutional perspective,
in order to determine whether the Tornillo decision controls the latter
issue. That comparison should not be only at the abstract level. The
37.
38.
39.
40.

SCHMIDT, supra note 25, at 233.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 220.
Id.

41.

Id. at 235.
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Tornillo decision, as aforementioned, does not portray as clear,
comprehensive and thoroughly reasoned access theory as perhaps it
should have. Hence, in order to better understand the decision's
rationales and examine them in the context of mandatory retraction,
the analysis should not refer only to a hypothetical right of reply
norm, but ought to focus particularly on the Florida right of reply
statute that was invalidated.
According to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Kramer v. Thompson,42 in dictum, "[a] "right of reply" differs from a
mandatory retraction in that the former merely requires the defamer
to provide space for a reply, whereas the latter requires the defamer
to mouth or pen the words the plaintiff would have him say. As such,
the unconstitutionality of compelled retraction would seem to follow
a fortiori from the Court's declaration that Florida's 'right of reply'
statute is unconstitutional., 43 Similarly, Professor Zechariah Chafee
argued that an editor's objection to including the victim's side of the
story, subject to restrictions of quantity and quality, is likely to be less
serious than in the case of mandatory retraction."
While mandatory retraction could indeed be regarded, from this
point of view, as more injurious to publishers than the Florida right of
reply, from other aspects the opposite is true.
First, and most importantly, according to the invalidated Florida
statute, failure to provide a right of reply under the prescribed
circumstances constituted a criminal offense. This highly radical
feature of the statute must have played an important if not a decisive
role in the Court's holding. Should it be removed from a proposed
settlement of mandatory retraction, as this article outlines below, our
evaluation of such proposal should substantially differ.
Second, obliging a publisher to provide a "stage" for outsiders
who are not employed by him could give rise to problems that do not
occur in mandatory retraction. Thus, a right of reply may be abused
by the subject of a report to present her version of the story in an
extremely one-sided way and even to fiercely defame the publisher,
and all this while using the latter's resources. Moreover, a public
figure given such a right would find it hard to resist the temptation to
insert additional contents into her reply, including a presentation of

42.
43.

Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666 (3rd Cir. 1991).
Id. at 681.

44.

ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 176

(1965).
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her agenda and self-praising irrelevant to the issue of the initial
report.
Third, the Florida cause of action was not contingent upon the
communication of false defamatory content but only upon a personal
attack. 4' The victim's right of reply, so it seems, was not confined to
rebutting asserted facts but also enabled her to express her views in
response to statements of pure opinion assailing her. As a large
number of politicians are being criticized by the various media on any
given day, the burden imposed on publishers by a Florida-style right
of reply statute would be very heavy. In contrast, mandatory
retraction, by definition, assumes the existence of defamatory
falsehood and kicks in only where a factual correction is needed.
It should be noted, finally, that although the concern mentioned
in Kramer about compelling a publisher to express statements he
disagrees with is genuine, it may be resolved. 4 This article will
attempt to do so within the discussion of the guidelines for
constitutionalizing mandatory retraction.
To sum up, it cannot be said that the invalidation of the Florida
statute's right of reply) necessarily implies the unconstitutionality of
mandatory retraction, in view of the inherent differences between the
two norms and the particular facts of the Tornillo case. Since the law
does not provide any authoritative answer to the question of the
constitutionality of mandatory retraction, this article shall now go on
to examine the various legal and policy considerations affecting it.
HI. Why Mandatory Retraction Cannot Be Deemed
Constitutional
It seems reasonable to assume that most American lawyers,
judges and legal scholars would instinctively reject the notion of
mandatory retraction based on two main grounds: the first is the
constitutional right enjoyed by all people and legal entities to refrain
from making any expression against their will, and the second is the
particular First Amendment protection granted to the press against
state intervention.
A. The Constitutional Right Not to Speak
Contemporary First Amendment doctrine treats content-based
regulation of speech as presumptively invalid, subjecting it to the

45. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,261 (1974).
46. Kramer,947 F.2d at 681.
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"strict scrutiny" test, and thus placing a high burden on the
government to justify it.47 Since any form of compelled expression on
a particular subject constitutes a content-based regulation, the
consistent approach of the Supreme Court has been that one has a
constitutional right to decide what not to say and not to express.
Few examples of the cases handling this issue would suffice in
order to get a good grasp of the Court's attitude. In the famous case
of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,48 the majority
opinion of the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a regulation
compelling a flag salute and pledge in public schools. In Wooley v.
Maynard,9 the Court invalidated a statute prohibiting car owners to
cover a motto expressing an ideology that was printed on state issued
license plates. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
5 0 it was decided that a company may not be
Commission of California,
forced by the state to insert in its monthly bills to its customers
political manifestos of a group whose views were opposed to its own.
5 1 the
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina,
majority opinion of the Supreme Court invalidated an act that, inter
alia, required professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors
the percentage of their gross receipts turned over to charities. In
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,2 a statute proscribing
distribution of campaign literature without disclosing the identity of
its author was invalidated. Finally, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,53 the Supreme Court reversed
a Massachusetts state court decision that obliged the organizers of a
parade to allow a group expressing a message that was not their own
to participate in that parade.
The problem of mandatory retraction seems to fall squarely into
the discussed category. Compelling a publisher to make a statement
of specific content, according to which his previous report has turned
out to be false, is arguably a clear infringement of his constitutional
right not to speak.

47. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT - FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION,
REGULATION OF MASS MEDIA, FREEDOM OF RELIGION 17-18 (1999).

48.
49.

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
430 U.S. 705 (1977).

50.
51.
52.
53.

475
487
514
515

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

1 (1986).
781 (1988).
334 (1995).
557 (1995).
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The Constitutional Protection of the Freedom of the Press

While the rule against compelled speech is enjoyed by everyone,
the discussion of mandatory retraction is invariably influenced to an
even greater extent by the specific protection granted by the First
Amendment to the press and the jurisprudence that evolved around
it.
1.

The Constitutionalizationof Defamation Law

There is little need to elaborate much on how high a status the
concept of a free press enjoys in the American law. The Supreme
Court has been extremely reluctant, especially in the last few decades,
to accept state interferences with the work of the press.54 The
significance attributed by the American law to maintaining the press
free in order for it to play its role as the "watchdog of democracy"
cannot be exaggerated. Of special importance to our context is the
fact that libel law, which up until 1964 had been a sterile territory of
private law, has since been subject to constitutional restraints. In the
Sullivan decision the Court held that the interest in enhancing an
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues, which
the First Amendment primarily protects, must be considered within
defamation law. 5 Hence, the Court set a high threshold for imposing
liability on a media defendant who had falsely defamed a public
figure: 6 proving the defendant's actual malice, meaning, his
knowledge, or reckless disregard, of the falsity.
The Court in Sullivan placed much emphasis in its analysis on the
"chilling effect", i.e., the danger that imposing civil liability on the
press for every erroneous factual assertion would lead it to use selfcensorship. "Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct
may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is
believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court."58 The Court further noted that as
errors of fact are inevitable in free debate, they must be protected if

54. This is true for federal and state interventions alike, as it is well established that
the First Amendment applies also to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process clause. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927).
55. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
56. The principle was originally applied in Sullivan to public officials, but was later
expanded to include also public figures. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, Ass'n Press v. Walker,
388 U.S. 130 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
57. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
58. Id. at 279.

2007] CONSTITUTIONALIZING MANDATORY RETRACrION IN DEFAMATION LAW

47

the freedom of expression is to have the "breathing space" it needs to
survive. 9
2. Protection of the EditorialAutonomy
While the strong protection granted to the press within the scope
of libel law leads to a general assumption that any new obligation
imposed on it would be looked upon with significant suspicion, a
deeper inquiry into the essence of that protection would provide even
greater support to the conclusion that mandatory retraction is
constitutionally problematic.
A common approach to the Press Clause, best articulated by
Justice Potter Stewart, contends that its purpose is to protect the
institutional autonomy of the press, thus creating a fourth, nonofficial branch of government that would function as an additional
check on the three official onesi 0 One practical meaning of this idea is
that the press must be allowed to be an active, independent, and nonneutral participant in the political sphere. With that notion in mind,
the Court in Sullivan stated that the debate generated by the press
"may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials., 61 It was also held in
another media defamation case that a "slashing and one-sided"
expression falls within the First Amendment protection.62 Moreover,
arguably, even the mere selection of contents to be published reflects
specific decisions about their value or veracity, and thus constitutes in
itself a protected communicative expression.63
A necessary component of the First Amendment doctrine, under
this view, is guaranteeing the editorial autonomy of the press. Thus, it
is contended that when a publisher, be it a newspaper or a television
station, exercises his editorial judgment, he is protected from any
intervention, including in the form of a requirement to publish
additional information for purposes of balance or fairness.6 In the
words of Professor Lucas Powe, "[t]he synergy of text, purpose,
history, and ongoing tradition have combined to validate an absolute
right of press autonomy from government in decisions about what

59. Id. at 271-72.
60. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975).
61. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
62. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988).
63. Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of EditorialJudgment, 78 NEB. L.
REV. 754, 762,808 (1999) [hereinafter Bezanson, Law of EditorialJudgment].
64. Id. at 822.
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and what not to publish., 65 The inability of the government to dictate
publication, he argues, is one of the crucial factors that enable the
press to perform its Fourth Estate role. 6 Powe further asserts that the
editorial autonomy is indivisible; if the editor does not have the final
say in every aspect of it, it does not exist. Therefore, in his view, its
protection must be absolute, as any minor erosion in the press
autonomy would eliminate the traditional barrier against
governmental intervention and create a slippery slope.67
Powe refers in particular to the right of reply, claiming that it
"does not make more information available to the newspaper's
readers; rather, it makes different information available... Under the
Florida statute, and under most likely proposals, a reply must be as
prominent as the original story ...Thus a right of reply will have the
effect of suppressing other items-probably other current affairs
topics-that an editor would otherwise have included." ' 8
Some of these mentioned notions are reflected prominently in
the Supreme Court's decision in Tornillo. The Court noted that,
the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the FirstAmendment
because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is
more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and
advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the
decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the
paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether
fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment.69
Furthermore, the penalty resulting from compelled publications,
according to the Court in Tornillo, is also exacted in terms of the cost
in printing and composing time and materials. 70 Apart from the
instant harm, the Court's analysis continued, compelled publications
could also have a chilling effect on the media's future behavior. As
the Court reasoned, "editors might well conclude that the safe course
is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under the operation of the Florida
statute, political
and electoral coverage would be blunted or
71
reduced.,

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Powe, supra note 32, at 283.
Id. at 285. See also Bezanson, supra note 63, at 760.
Powe, supra note 32, at 277, 283.
Id. at 276.
Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 257.

2007] CONSTITUTIONALIZING MANDATORY RETRACTION IN DEFAMATION LAW

49

The considerations detailed above-the intervention in the
editorial decisions of what to publish, and what not to publish, the
interference with the ability of the press to have complete control
over the messages it wishes .to convey, the chilling effect, and the
economic costs-which were raised in most cases in relation to the
right of reply, are highly relevant to the issue of mandatory retraction
as well. It may also be added, specifically in the context of mandatory
retraction, that reporting a publisher's professional mistakes could
injure his reputation. Hence, there might be a reluctance to publish
controversial statements about public figures which could lead to
demands for retraction.72 That alleged tendency could be furthered by
the financial effect that arguably accompanies the embarrassment in
such a case, as a retraction might render a publisher unreliable, and
harm him in the market.73 In sum, although the contention made by
one commentator that a right of reply and mandatory retraction are
comparable to compelled press publications praising the government
in totalitarian countries7 4 seems utterly exaggerated and misplaced,
the mentioned factors indeed have the potential of derogating the
freedom of the press should mandatory retraction be recognized.
IV. Arguments Favoring the Legitimization of
Mandatory Retraction
Without prejudicing the immeasurable importance of the
freedom of speech and the freedom of the press in a democratic
society, as explained in the previous section, one must never forget
that the defamation equation has another side.75 The following section
will discuss two considerations that may lead to the conclusion that
there is a strong interest in trying to legitimize mandatory retraction
in certain cases.
A. Enhancing Public Figures' Right of Reputation
The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he right of a man to the
protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and
wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential
dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any

72.
73.

Vindication of Reputation, supra note 6, at 1742.
John C. Martin, The Role of Retraction in Defamation Suits, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL

F. 293, 310-11 (1993).
74. Abrams, supra note 33, at 368.
75. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990).
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decent system of ordered liberty." 76 This rhetoric does not reflect
faithfully the legal reality. Following Sullivan, American law provides

little protection for reputation of public figures. Most victims of false
defamation among this group cannot meet the demanding actual
malice requirement, and thus remain without remedy. 7 The Sullivan
rule also makes litigation lengthy and expensive due to the
complexity of establishing actual malice, thereby deterring falsely
defamed individuals to an even greater extent from seeking damages.
Hence, the balance between the right of reputation and the freedom
of the press has been significantly disrupted in favor of the latter."
The Supreme Court, in Sullivan and other decisions to follow,
did not ignore the harm that would be caused to defamed persons by

the newly created libel regime, but confronted it using two main
rationalizations. These arguments, however, are not fully convincing.
First, the Court contended that an individual who decides to seek
governmental office, as well as a person otherwise classified as a
public figure, knowingly runs the risk of being exposed to closer
public scrutiny than other people.79 Yet, that idea hardly compels the

conclusion that the public figure must be left without remedy when
that "scrutiny" takes the form of defamatory falsehood. ° Moreover,
the category of public figure is by no means limited to those who seek

76. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
77. This fact is also attributable to subsequent decisions in which the Supreme Court
expanded the protection granted to media defendants by the Sullivan rule. For instance, in
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), the Court held
that an appellate court should review a jury's finding of actual malice. In addition, the
common law rule as to the burden of proof was substituted by the principle that a public
figure plaintiff must establish the falsity of the speech before recovering damages from a
media defendant. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986). Finally,
the Court ruled in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657
(1989) that actual malice must be shown by "clear and convincing proof." Id. at 659.
78.

See, e.g., SCHMIDT, supra note 25, at 247; David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law

Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 488 (1991); David A. Barrett, Declaratory
Judgmentsfor Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CAL. L. REV. 847, 862-63 (1986); Jonathan G.
Erwin, Can Deterrence Play a Positive Role in Defamation Law?, 19 REV. LITIG. 675, 692
(2000); Hulme, supra note 3, at 376; Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J. Gaertner, The
Annenberg Libel Reform Proposal:The Case for Enactment, 31 WM AND MARY L. REV.
25, 31 (1989); Vindication of Reputation, supra note 6, at 1731-32. The harsh criticism came
out not only from politicians and the academia but also from within the Supreme Court.
Thus, despite joining the judgment in Sullivan, Justice White later expressed his doubts as
to the soundness of the Court's approach, and asserted that it has the consequence of
unduly undermining the right of reputation. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 769 (1985) (White, J., concurring); Miami Herald v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 263 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
79. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,344-45 (1974).
80. Anderson, supra note 78, at 527.
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positions or wish to engage in activities that would inherently put
them in the spotlight. For example, police officers are almost
invariably classified as public officials, no matter how low their rank;81
public school teachers may be regarded as public figures, at least
under certain circumstances;82 and quite absurdly, in one case even a
physician was considered a public figure, by virtue of the very
journalistic reports that handled the alleged medical malpractice in
the institute where she was working.83
Second, the Court argued that public figures have greater access
than most private citizens to the media, which can be used by them as
self-help in order to protect their reputations. 84 As Schmidt noted,
"[i]n the critical effort to accommodate competing values of freedom
of the press and protection of individual reputation, the Supreme
Court has tended to view defamation law and access (either by right
The more access,
or as a practical matter) as a complex equilibrium.
85
remedies.
defamation
for
need
less
the
The assumption of access, however, has been harshly criticized.
Justice Brennan wrote that "[d]enials, retractions, and corrections are
not 'hot' news, and rarely receive the prominence of the original
story." He therefore concluded that the Court's "unproved, and
highly improbable" assumption as to the effectiveness of self-help
''seems too insubstantial a reed on which to rest a constitutional
distinction., 86 Similar doubts were expressed by Professor Harry
Kalven, according to whom "[f]or centuries it has been the experience
of Anglo-American law that the truth never catches up with the lie,
and it is because it does not that there has been a law of

81. Anderson, supra note 78, at 527. See, e.g., Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604 (Del.
1971); Roche v. Egan, 433 A.2d 757, 762 (Me. 1981).
1st
82. Johnson v. Bd. of Junior Coll. Dist. No. 508, 334 N.E.2d 442, 447 (App. Ct. Ill.,
Dist. 1975; Scarpelli v. Jones, 626 P.2d 785, 790 (Kan. 1981).
83. Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 683 (Mass. 2005), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 927 (2005).
84. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 304-05; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
85. SCHMIDT, supra note 25, at 81. It should be mentioned that at least in one
instance the Supreme Court expressed, in dicta, sympathy toward access rights in libel law,
stating that "[i]f the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond adequately
to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their ability to
respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public concern".
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 (1971). Interestingly, the Tornillo Court
cited that statement, but refrained from confronting it directly. Miami Herald v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 252 (1974).
86. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46-7 (1971).
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defamation."87 Thus, he resists the idea that the constitutional theory
can be based on the assurance that counterarguments will take the
sting out of the falsehoods.8 With regard to certain groups of people
which were included by the -ruling in the public official and public
figure categories, at least in certain circumstances, such as junior
police officers, public school teachers, and physicians, the assumption
of access seems even more dubious.
It may be claimed that the reality has changed since Justice
Brennan and Professor Kalven wrote the words quoted above, mainly
in light of one specific development-the Internet. Arguably, public
figures can nowadays use this forum to present their versions with
regard to the allegations against them, thus eliminating the injustice
caused by the law. However, the effect of communications conveyed
to the public through the web seems weak in comparison with those
made by the traditional media, for several reasons.
First, although the aggregate extent of the use of the Internet is
in constant increase, it seems that the vast exposure to the mass media
of almost the entire Western population still outweighs the popularity
of news websites,"9 forums, and blogs. Even in those cases in which
information of public importance is first revealed on the Internet,
only following its dissemination by the traditional mass media does it
reach the wide public. If one assumes, as Justice Brennan did, that
denials of defamatory charges do not raise much interest on the part
of the press, there is little reason to believe that it would follow-up
replies published on the Internet in a more extensive manner.
Second, the nature of the discussed medium is highly
decentralized. The number of Internet sources from which
information can be retrieved is immense, and the amount of data
available in cyberspace is almost imperceivable. Therefore, the effect
of any publication on the Internet, even on the most popular
websites, cannot match that of a report on a nation-wide television
network or in a leading newspaper. The same may arguably be said
also with regard to smaller media. Despite the large number of
television stations and newspapers throughout the United States that
are local or niche-specific, it is still incomparable to the number of
websites and forums.

87. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and
Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 267, 300 (1967).
88. Id.
89. Actually, one might guess that at least some of the most popular news websites
are operated by the major newspapers and television stations themselves.
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Third, and most importantly, on many occasions, in order to
retrieve from the Internet information about a certain topic, one has
to conduct an active, target-oriented search. A surfer who is not
interested in looking for a public figure's response to a report
defaming her will probably not run across such a response. In
contrast, reading a newspaper and watching a television newscast are
much more passive activities, as the audience is exposed to contents
selected, edited and communicated to it by others. Therefore, any
publication in these media is likely to have greater exposure and
effect. While a report included in a certain newscast will be seen by all
of its viewers, only a portion of them-presumably not a large onewill get to read a response published by the subject of the story on the
Internet.
A final assertion that supposedly underrates the reputational
damage caused by false publications, is that such harm may be
undone by market mechanisms. Meaning, the falsity of erroneous
stories is likely to be exposed by media other than the original
publisher, driven by their interest in competition. But that
consideration should also be given limited weight.
First, it cannot be assumed that competing media will always be
willing to bear the cost of conducting an extensive investigation in
order to refute a defaming report. This is so especially since, as
Justice Brennan contended, vindicating publications tend to raise less
public attention.9 Therefore, even if journalists often feel urged to
doubt the accuracy of their colleagues' stories, the fact that the
publishers might have somewhat low financial incentives to conduct
such investigations could cause many reports to remain unquestioned.
Second, arguably owners of mass media may sometimes choose
not to attack certain publications of one another.9 1 That concern is
increased by the fact that the control over communication is
centralized in the hands of a relatively small group which owns and
operates the mass media.9 The combination of the two
aforementioned factors leads to the conclusion that the legal policy
should not be based on the hope that false defaming publications will
always, or even often, be rebutted.
Third, no one guarantees that the refuting report, if one is
published, would bear similar prominence to that of the original story.
90. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46.
91. See Hulme, supra note 3, at 394 n.101; Vindication of Reputation, supra note 6, at
1732.
92. POWE, supra note 32, at 272; Thomas A. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 953 (1963).
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And even if it would, the chances of its reaching the same audience
are doubtful. One can assume that many media consumers tend to be
"loyal" to one certain publication, or to a limited number of
publications, at least during a given period of time. Hence, in the
described scenario, the extent of exposure to the correction, among
the regular audience of the defaming publisher, is expected to be
significantly lower in comparison to the original report. Indeed, the
second report would necessarily reach other audiences, but the
interest of the victim in vindicating her reputation naturally relates
mainly or exclusively to the former group.
Accordingly, in the existing law, the fact that a defaming
publication has been claimed to be false by another publisher-as
opposed to being retracted by the same publisher-may never serve
to bar a damages suit or to limit the recoverable damages a priori,and
it seems that that factor is very seldom considered also as mitigating
the damage. It follows that the underlying assumption of the law is
that such publications do not cure the reputational harm.93
In sum, the situation caused by Sullivan is very problematic; the
strong skepticism regarding the effectiveness of self-help is justified,
and it is also doubtful whether the market forces can come to the
rescue. If the Sullivan rule is to maintain its status, then the
equilibrium of interests implied by the Supreme Court requires the
enhancement of access rights to compensate for the denial of
damages in most cases. The need to promote the ability of defamation
victims to vindicate their reputation should therefore be treated more
seriously.
B.

Increasing the Quality of Self-Governance

The negative consequences of disseminating false information
about public figures are not confined to individual harm. The
approach favoring the restriction of civil liability for such publications
to a minimum, which is derived from First Amendment
considerations, seems to harm a crucial societal interest protected by
the First Amendment itself.

93. Indeed, the compensation granted in that scenario could relate to the emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff following the publication, and not to the reputational
harm; the former damage does not disappear retroactively, even if the reputational harm
is ultimately cured. However, if contradicting publications in other media were considered
effective in remedying the reputational harm, one could at least expect that they would
often be raised as a mitigation argument. As aforementioned, apparently this is not the
case.
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The Supreme Court has stated that "speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of selfgovernment."9' This notion, which tightly connects the freedom of
speech and the concept of representative democracy, is deeply rooted
in the American legal and political tradition. As Meiklejohn
explained, "[t]he First Amendment... protects the freedom of those
activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern' ....
Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the
general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to
express." 95 In Emerson's words, "[A]II men [are] entitled to
participate in the process of formulating the common decisions ....
In order for the process to operate at its best, every relevant fact must
be brought out, every opinion and every insight must be available for
consideration. "' 6 The information whose free flow is most crucial,
according to this approach, concerns the actions of the government
and its people.97
This line of argument, which is normally raised to justify strict
protection of the freedom of the press to communicate to the public
facts and opinions on public affairs, may also shed light on the severe
problems arising from the current libel regime. As Justice White
noted, "First Amendment values are not at all served by circulating
false statements of fact about public officials. On the contrary,
erroneous information frustrates these values." 98 Since, following
Sullivan, in most cases the dissemination of defamatory
disinformation about public figures is not recognized judicially as a
wrong, "the public continue to be misinformed about public
matters." 99 This situation may bring about further substantial
implications. On certain occasions, for example, false accusations
could result in the public losing a valuable servant. ' ° In addition, by
creating fear of false accusations for which no compensation would be
granted, the Supreme Court's approach may deter good people from
participation in public life.' °' Most significantly, the persistence of
94. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
95. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV.
245, 255 (1961).
96. Emerson, supra note 92, at 882.
97. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 768.
100. Vindication of Reputation, supra note 6, at 1737.
101. Id.; Anderson, supra note 78, at 531.
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false information in the public mind inevitably leads it to make worse
decisions in the course of self-governing.
The common notion that the triumph of the truth is not to be
achieved immediately but rather ultimately, and that a system of free
expression rests upon subordination of current interests in favor of
long-term benefits,"° is relevant primarily to struggles of ideologies.
However, it is hardly appealing when defamatory falsehoods about
public officials are concerned. The realm of managing the everyday
life of a state and a society is by nature highly dominated by shortterm electoral considerations. Therefore, the willingness to let the
falsehood prevail within its scope, if only temporarily, is highly
detrimental. There is not much comfort both to the individual who
had been falsely defamed and to the society that had lost an
outstanding public official if the truth finally prevails after many
years.
Hence, it may be argued that in order to enhance the efficiency
of the political system and the quality of the electoral decisionmaking, it is a supreme interest for every democratic society to
ensure, as much as possible, that its citizens have accurateinformation
about those who govern them. "The theory of democracy postulates
the ability of citizens to make intelligent decisions-decisions which
can only be made in an environment of widespread, abundant, and
accurate information. Society, therefore, has an interest in correcting
defamatory misstatements about matters of public concern."10 3 If the
acute need to prevent distortion of the self-government system is to
be treated seriously, then some limited form of state intervention may
be legitimized.
Some support for this view has been voiced in the past. As
aforementioned, a similar conception led the Supreme Court to
uphold the personal attack rule in Red Lion"1 " In Professor Barron's
opinion, since "marketplace of ideas" reality does not exist anymore,
"[t]he opportunity for counterattack ought to be at the very heart of a
constitutional theory . . . . If no such right is afforded or even
considered, it seems meaningless to talk about vigorous public
debate."'0 5 Professor Owen Fiss further explains that the danger of
restricting or impoverishing public debate is presented by all social
institutions, private or public, and not merely by the state. In his view,
102.

Emerson, supra note 92, at 894.

103.
104.

Vindication of Reputation, supra note 6, at 1730.
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).

105. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1658-59 (1967).
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governmental regulation of speech should be tolerated since only the
state has the necessary power to enhance the quality of public debate,
and because its employees are more publicly accountable than any
private body." 6
The issue of access rights, which exceeds the scope of this
research, is highly controversial. The First Amendment theory has
traditionally been identified with a strong laissez-faire approach, 7 in
light of the deep suspicion toward the state that has always
characterized American thinking. Indeed, the critics of the access
theory may be right in their claim that a power to enhance the quality
of self-governance might be abused by the state.'08 However, while the
proposals presented by Barron, Fiss and others, which include
massive governmental regulation of the media and broad access
rights, seem excessively intrusive, their analysis is inspirational. The
right solution, therefore, could be a more modest version of these
proposals. At least in the context of mandatory retraction, the
concern over access rights may be diminished to a minimum if the
most suitable institutions are assigned to the task, and if the means to
be employed are carefully chosen.
V. Constitutionalizing Mandatory Retraction
In light of the considerations raised in the preceding discussion, it
is arguably justified to oblige publishers to retract false defamatory
reports. On the other hand, a mandatory retraction rule must be very
limited in its scope in order to minimize the harm to the publishers'
right not to speak and to their editorial autonomy. The following
section will try to explain which features could make a mandatory
retraction rule constitutional, and why. It shall begin by portraying
the basic practical elements of a proposed legal settlement and their
underlying rationales, and subsequently, discuss them in a
constitutional framework. This theoretical analysis will yield further
practical insights, which will be combined in the discussion.
There seems to be a general consensus that if mandatory
retraction survived constitutional scrutiny, such a novel and
revolutionary norm should properly originate with the state
legislatures and not the courts.' 9 Hence, our effort will be to

106. Fiss, supranote 26, at 787-94.
107. SCHMIDT, supra note 25, at 37; Diamond, supra note 3, at 293.
108. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 32, at 277.
109. Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 682 (3rd Cir. 1991); Coughlin v.
Westinghouse Broad. and Cable, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 483, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Beasley v.
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determine the elements that such a statute must include in order to be
deemed constitutional.
A. The Proposal

The core of the proposed settlement is empowering courts
handling public figures' libel actions against any kind of media, upon
finding that the publication in question has been proved as false by
clear and convincing evidence, to grant a declaratory relief stating
that the falsity has been so proved, accompanied by an injunction
ordering the defendant to report on that holding. In order to prevail,
the plaintiff would not have to show that the defendant had acted
with actual malice prior to the publication.
Under this proposal, a claim for the said remedy may be filed
independently, or together with an action for damages. In the latter
case, the trial would be divided into two stages. In the first one, the
court would examine whether the defaming publication is true or
false. If the mentioned evidential standard were met by the plaintiff,
an injunctive relief ordering the defendant to report on that finding
would be issued. In the second part of the procedure the actual malice
question would be discussed; if the courts find that the publication
was made with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity, the
damages the plaintiff is entitled to under Sullivan will be
supplemented to the injunction.
The compelled publication would not, strictly speaking,
constitute a withdrawal of the defamatory charge on the part of the
publisher, since it is the court, and not him, that will declare the falsity
of the publication. Though a statement of withdrawal on the part of
the defamer is probably the best device for restoring reputation, the
constitutional constraints, which will be explained below, compel the
choice of the described settlement as the second-best option. In any
case, as the publisher will have to inform his audience of the judicial
finding, the effect of the remedy would not be very remote from that
of a retraction in its regular sense; it may be defined as a
"constructive retraction." For the sake of convenience, this article will
refer to it as retraction.""
Hearst Corp., 11 Med. L. Rptr. 2067, 2074 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1985); SCHMIDT, supra note 25,
at 239-40.
110 It should be noted that several proposals for establishing a procedure of a
declaratory judgment regarding the falsity of libelous publications were put forward by a
Congressional Bill and by various scholars and groups, mainly in the 1980s. E.g., H.R.
2846, 99th Cong.(1985) (the Schumer Bill); Barrett, supra note 78; Marc A. Franklin, A
Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1986);
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Several elements of this proposal require clarification and
elaboration.
Substantive-Law Duty or JudicialRemedy?
An initial choice had to be made between two legal devices for
enhancing the correction of false publications. The first is recognizing
an independent substantive-law duty to retract-in the usual sense of
the word-false defamatory charges, whose breach may result in an
injunction, damages award or a combination of both. The second is
remedy-either
"regular"
or
introducing
a
retraction
"constructive"-that would be given by a court following a judicial
procedure that handles the liability for the original publication.
The concurring opinion of Justices Brennan and Rehnquist in
Tornillo seems to have preferred the second alternative. The Justices
suggested that "statutes affording plaintiffs able to prove defamatory
falsehoods a statutory action to require publication of a retraction"
(emphasis added) could be constitutional.111 Professor Rodney
Smolla, despite concluding ultimately that such a rule would be too
draconian, also thinks that in principle "[tlhe Tornillo holding did not
necessarily foreclose a compulsory retraction as a post-judgment
remedy after a court has determined in a full-fledged defamation suit
that liability exists.' ' . In contrast, the nature of the rule proposed by
Judge Pollak in the Coughlin case seems different. In his view, a
"continuing series of events, non-retraction, after the asserted
defamer has been sufficiently educated to the falsity of what was
originally published," may be deemed actionable. "3 The liability for
such a conduct would be contingent on "a full demonstration to the
defamer of the falsity of the alleged defamation,"'" 4 and the remedy
for it would be damages. It follows that according to Judge Pollak, the
duty to retract would not stem from a judicial order but rather from
the very fact that the publisher has learned of the falsity of his
publication.
1.

Hulme, supra note 3; Stanley Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict between Reason and
Decency, 65 VA. L. REV. 785, 852-53 (1979) [hereinafter Ingber, Defamation]; Leval, supra
note 5; THE ANNENBERG PROPOSAL, supra note 6, Section 4. These attempts were not
successful. This article will not elaborate on the propriety of such a remedy, since that
issue has been discussed extensively before. Its focus is not on the mere issuance of a
declaratory judgment but rather on the element which distinguishes the described
proposal the most from the previous ones, namely, the compelled report on the verdict.
111. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974).
112. 2 SMOLLA, supra note 1, §9:92, at 9-63.
113. Coughlin, 689 F. Supp. at 483.
114. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
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The substantive law should not recognize an independent duty to
retract emanating directly from a false defamatory publication
followed by a retraction demand, just as the obligation to pay
damages as a result of such publication arises only as a judicial
remedy."5 Rather, a proper retraction regime ought to prescribe that
a publisher may be obliged to retract only by virtue of a judicial
order. Otherwise, severe practical and constitutional problems would
emerge. Regardless of how extensively a statute attempted to clarify
the conditions under which a retraction is mandatory, many factual
and legal considerations would have to be taken into account before
reaching a conclusion in any given case. Primarily, it must be
determined that the statutory standard for establishing falsity has
been met, and that such falsity substantially alters the impact of the
publication on the audience's mind. These parameters require an
assessment which must be performed by a court; especially in the
border-line cases, it would simply be impractical to expect a publisher
to recognize when a duty to retract has arisen. Moreover, in such
circumstances, a publisher who knows that failure to retract may
result in immense monetary liability would be likely to adopt too
liberal an interpretation of the statutory provision, in order to be on
the safe side and evade that risk. If that happens, legitimate points of
view would be unjustly silenced and removed from the public
discourse. Finally, and most importantly, the issuance of a judicial
decision as a prerequisite to the retraction is necessitated by the rule
against compelled speech. The reason is that, as explained below, to
be compatible with the First Amendment, the subject of the
compelled publication can only be the very fact that such a decision
was given, as opposed to a statement on behalf of the defendant
admitting that the defamatory report is false.
The traditional reluctance of the Anglo-American law to use an
equitable relief when the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, in
particular with regard to speech, 11' should not undermine its
appropriateness in our context.
First, as explained earlier, the notion of granting damages for
breach of a substantive-law duty to retract is highly problematic,
whereas the ability to recover damages for the original publication is
115. Indeed, it could be argued that an infringement of a norm creates a conceptual
substantive-law duty to compensate the harmed person. The emphasis of this article,
nevertheless, is on the practical aspect: a person is not required by law to pay damages for
defamation until his liability and its scope are determined by a court, and therefore, that
should be the case also with regard to a duty to retract.
116. Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 679 (3d Cir. 1991).
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not a sufficient solution, since it is not feasible save for the rare cases
in which actual malice is established. Furthermore, as asserted below,
even when damages are recoverable, the societal interest in actual
correction of false defamation transcends the individual's right to be
compensated with money.
Second, no analogy can be drawn from the presumption against
prior restraint" 7 to an injunction ordering retraction. The reason is,
simply, that while the former directly stifles speech, the latter only
adds speech to the public domain. Arguably, nevertheless, the
proposed settlement could indirectly chill speech. That contention
will be discussed below.
2.

Applicability to Different Kinds of Media

The second important issue that needs to be addressed is the
applicability of the retraction remedy to different kinds of media.
Various arguments may be raised in order to justify its suitability to a
certain kind of media while denying it with regard to another.
On the one hand, in view of the scarcity of communications
frequencies and the government's role in allocating them, licensing
the broadcasters, and monitoring their activities,' s state intervention
in the content of broadcasts is arguably more plausible than in the
case of newspapers. Against this background, recall the Red Lion
decision that, based on the mentioned factors, upheld the personal
attack rule applied to the broadcast media. "9 However, the
conceptual dissimilarity between the two media is arguably not as
important as the practical dimension of the comparison, from which
the difference does not seem that great. Given the abundance of
television and radio stations, and since, on the other hand, the
number of newspapers is far from being infinite, it may be contended
that there is no basis for distinction between print and broadcast
media with regard to access rights. 2 '
On the other hand, a case may be made for favorable treatment
of the broadcast media with regard to mandatory retraction. It has
been asserted that while the cost to a newspaper of an additional
column is negligible, the burden may be immense for a television
network which must forego revenue from the sale of valuable, limited

117. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
118. Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399b (2000).
119. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,392 (1969).
120. See Barron, supra note 105, at 1666.
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time in order to publish a retraction. 2' Yet the strength of this
argument is also doubtful. Newspapers are also distributed for the
purpose of revenue and make substantial profits from inserting
advertisements, which might be "sacrificed" in order to clear space
for retractions.
In conclusion, the mentioned factors virtually neutralize each
other. In the narrow context of our discussion, the difference between
the two kinds of media does not justify a material distinction. The
substantive clashing values, namely, the right to reputation and the
interest of maintaining an informed society on the one hand and the
freedom of the press on the other, are similar in both cases. The
retraction settlement should therefore apply to the print as well as to
the broadcast media. Its suitability to television may be achieved, for
instance, by compelling retraction
in the form of a brief
1 22
announcement within a newscast.
The issue of mandatory retraction should be considered in
respect of another medium, namely, the Internet. Conflicting
arguments may be raised in this context as well. On the one hand, as
mentioned above, the highly fragmented nature of the web renders
Internet publications less influential than those made by the
traditional media. It could therefore be said that Internet retractions
are not necessary since Internet defamatory publications are not very
harmful. However, in light of the high accessibility of most websites
to an immense number of people, as well as the Internet's proven
potential of serving as a forum for publications of public importance,
it may well be regarded as a part of the media for defamation law
purposes. The fact that online publications do not receive as extensive
exposure as that of television and newspapers stories (and thus
cannot be used effectively to redress defamatory charges published by
these media) does not mean that they should not, in and of
themselves, be considered as media publications. Thus, arguably, the
Sullivan rationale may apply to online publications with a potential
for reaching a substantial amount of people, as opposed to ones which
are included in narrow forums with restricted membership. 23 In any

121. Vindication of Reputation, supra note 6, at 1742.
122. It should be emphasized that a duty to retract would not be imposed on the
broadcast media by administrative intervention on the part of the FCC, but, like in the
case of newspapers, only by the courts.
123. Indeed, the Sullivan standard has been applied to Internet defamation cases. E.g.,
Agora, Inc. v. Axxess, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 697, 701 (2000); Amway Corp. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14455 (W.D. Mich. 2001); In re Baxter, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26001 (W.D. La. 2001).
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case, if indeed Internet defamation of public figures is to be
adjudicated by the Sullivan standard, then it may also give rise to a
duty to retract. 2 4 Internet retractions are of particular importance due
to the fact that this medium "perpetuates words," in the sense that it
stores huge amounts of information in a highly accessible form for a
potentially unlimited period of time. Hence, on the one hand, a
defamatory publication on the Internet is likely to bring about
enduring harm, and on the other hand, a retraction could have a longlasting effect as it may be reachable long after it is initially published.
Moreover, in this realm the availability of publishing space is
probably the highest, and therefore, in that respect, compelled
retraction would not be very problematic.
3.

Further Technicalities

Finally, several technical notes are in place.
First, the falsity that would give rise to a retraction injunction is
one that concerns the heart of the defamatory charge. Since it is
established that minor inaccuracies, which do not significantly change
the publication's effect on the mind of the audience in respect of the
"sting" of the libel,'25 do not entitle the plaintiff to damages, the law
should prescribe the same with regard to the retraction remedy.
Second, a mandatory retraction rule would not necessarily
preclude the existing state retraction statutes. Thus, while voluntary
retraction may bar action or limit the scope of recoverable damages,
failure to retract in the required form would open the door to a suit,
in which one of the remedies could be an injunctive relief ordering
retraction.
Third, the mandatory retraction provision, as well as the court
order applying it, must have a clearly delineated "who, what, when,
and where.', 2 6 Most importantly, by analogy to what is normally
prescribed by the existing voluntary retraction statutes, the retraction
must be given due prominence considering the character of the
original report. When a newspaper is involved, the updating article
should be put, as much as possible, in the same section, in a similar
page and under a similarly-sized headline. A television or a radio
station should broadcast the retraction in more or less the same part
124. The question of liability for anonymous defamatory publications on the Internet
exceeds the scope of this article. At any rate, I suggest that anyone who would nowadays
be held liable for such publications, be it a forum manager, a website owner, or the like,
would be subject to the retraction remedy provided that its conditions are met.
125. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991).
126. Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 78, at 40.
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of the newscast as the one in which the first report was aired. If the
defaming report appeared on an Internet website, a retraction should
be included in its contents in a prominent place (e.g., on the top of the
homepage) for a sufficient amount of time as determined by the
court. The underlying notion behind these guidelines is to reach, to
the largest extent achievable,
1 •.
127 the same audience that was exposed to
the defamatory publication.
B. Constitutional Analysis: General
The preliminary question to be asked within the constitutional
analysis of mandatory retraction is the level of scrutiny that ought to
be employed. Since a statute dictating the substance of material to be
published constitutes, as aforementioned, content-based regulation of
speech, it must pass the double test of strict scrutiny.
1.

CompellingInterest

The first condition under strict scrutiny is establishing a
compelling government interest. At the outset, it should be noted that
the Supreme Court's rulings have not identified a clear rationale as to
why libel law, which constitutes content regulation of speech, is
deemed constitutional at all. This general theoretical question
exceeds the scope of this article. However, the existence of a
justification for protecting reputation at the cost of regulating speech
to a certain extent seems to be widely accepted. The extreme
absolutist position, according to which defamation law must be
abolished or cannot apply to public officials,128 was never adopted by
the Supreme Court. The assumption, therefore, should be that the
need to protect reputation is a compelling interest. The real issue
concerns the extent to which it is compelling, which in turn implicates
the question of what level and methods of protection may be deemed
justified under the First Amendment.
The aggregate weight of the considerations detailed above in the
third section, demonstrating the severe individual and societal harms
created by contemporary American defamation law, amounts to a
compelling interest that justifies the adoption of a mandatory
retraction rule. The proposed settlement is likely to significantly
enhance public figures' right of reputation, which is currently poorly
protected. A declaratory judgment stating that the falsity of the

127. Cf. 2 SMOLLA, supra note 1, §9:82, at 9-54.
128. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-305 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring).
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defamation has been proved by clear and convincing evidence will
1 29
represent a formal judicial vindication of the plaintiff's reputation.
The prospects of a person who has been falsely defamed to obtain
such vindication are high, since she would be exempted from the
requirement of proving the publisher's actual malice, which currently
causes most plaintiffs to lose. Moreover, since a declaratory judgment
procedure is likely to be faster than a claim for damages, 3 ' the
vindicating decision will be issued a relatively short time after the
defamation, and would thus be able to wipe out the impact of the
report on the audience's mind rather effectively. The most significant
part of the remedy is the court's power to order the defendant to
report on the verdict, thereby guaranteeing its wide circulation among
the audience that was exposed to the defamation.
2.

The Least Restrictive Measure

The second prong of the strict scrutiny test is the lack of a
measure which produces similar results but is less detrimental to
protected rights. One could think of three plausible alternatives
(other than the unconstitutional right of reply) which, like mandatory
retraction, purport to promote the actual vindication of reputation
rather than compensate the victim with money. These options are a
declaratory judgment on the falsity of the publication unaccompanied
by a compelled report on the decision, a voluntary retraction, and a
state-provided forum for reply.
The assessment of the declaratory judgment proposals raised
previously does not preclude the constitutionality of the discussed
proposal. The mere issuance of a judgment determining the falsity of
the publication is not effective enough in vindicating the plaintiff's
reputation absent wide publicity; and it is questionable whether such
decisions would be reported extensively. 3' Justice Brennan's
contention that "[d]enials, retractions, and corrections are not 'hot'
news"' 132 may equally apply to vindicating verdicts. Since the public
generally shows the highest interest in outrages, the press tends to
attach greater emphasis to sensational stories about public figures
than to reports rebutting such allegations. Hence, declaratory
judgments would probably be insufficiently publicized, especially in
comparison with the defamatory statements preceding them.'33
129. Barrett, supra note 78, at 870.
130. Franklin, supra note 110, at 830.
131. Leval, supra note 5, at 1299.
132. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46 (1971).
133. Ingber, supra note 3, at 835.
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Significantly, the fact that these judgments will not be accompanied
by immense sums of compensation would further diminish their
sensational appeal. It should also be noted that defendants who are
aware of the falsity of the defamation might choose not to litigate and
to lose by a default judgment, in order to avoid the litigation costs and
to decrease even more the public attention gained by the procedure.
Finally, some argue that certain media tend not to give publicity to
libel judgments entered against their competitors, driven either by
professional courtesy or by fear that they will receive similar
treatment.13 4 It follows from the foregoing arguments that the
effectiveness of a declaratory judgment alone in restoring the
plaintiff's reputation is doubtful. The chances of achieving that
objective, by reaching the largest portion possible of the audience
that had been exposed to the original story, are substantially higher if
a report on the judgment, in the same medium and with the same
prominence, is compelled.
Some proponents of the declaratory relief procedure, aware of
the aforementioned problem, offer various techniques, other than
mandatory report on the verdict, to handle it. One commentator,
James Hulme, suggests compelling the losing defendant to circulate
the judgment of falsity as extensively as was the publication of the
defamatory statement.'35 This suggestion, however, raises some major
practical quandaries. For instance, it is unclear which methods are to
be employed in order to efficiently circulate the judgment while
raising sufficient public attention; who will monitor their
implementation and how; and whether reluctance on the part of other
media to publicize the judgment prominently at the expense of other
newsworthy material, or to publicize it at all, may give rise to judicial
injunctions against them, given the fact that they are not a party to
the litigation. Another proposed solution, offered by Ingber, is
ordering the defendant to choose between publishing a retraction and
financing the reasonable costs of a reply which is to be published by
the plaintiff elsewhere. 36 Both options seem unsatisfactory. A
"regular" retraction is constitutionally more problematic than a duty
to report on the vindicating verdict, as will be explained below. The
second alternative suffers from the disadvantages of the Hulme
proposal, in addition to raising the problem of the possible abuse of
the right of reply, discussed above in Section 1. Thus, disagreements
134.
1732.
135.
136.

Hulme, supra note 3, at 394 n.101; Vindication of Reputation, supra note 6, at
Hulme, supra note 3, at 392.
Ingber, Defamation, supra note 110, at 852.
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between the parties as to the appropriate means of publication on the
one hand and the contents that may legitimately be included in the
reply on the other are very likely to occur. This would almost
invariably yield further litigation and make the procedure inefficient.
The second plausible alternative to mandatory retractionvoluntary retraction-is even less satisfactory. Compelling publishers
to retract is undoubtedly more effective in reaching the outcome of
restoring reputations than merely encouraging them to do so. Indeed,
it might be argued that so long as a settlement of voluntary retraction
creates sufficient incentives to retract, it may be held to achieve the
same goal with less restrictive means. However, given the fact that the
chances of publishers to prevail in damages libel suits are incredibly
high, and despite the high litigation costs incurred by such suits, it is
hard to believe that any voluntary retraction rule may ever reach that
level of success. In any case, the question of the extent to which the
various existing and proposed settlements of voluntary retraction
indeed do manage to achieve the same goal fulfilled by mandatory
retraction is a very complex one. A comprehensive examination of it
must invariably involve empirical research that would try to indicate
these settlements' effectiveness. Such research entails the hard task of
isolating the retraction norm's impact on the publishers from the
political reality, the public atmosphere, and the market conditions
prevailing in the relevant jurisdiction, as well as any other factor that
might influence the publishers' discretion in any given case.
Ultimately, this exercise is unlikely to lead to any conclusive answers
upon which constitutional criteria may be based.
Finally, a state-provided forum for responses by defamed people
or for publicizing libel declaratory judgments, be it in magazines,
websites or city centers, is unlikely to draw public attention that
would come near that of a headline in a popular newspaper or
newscast. It therefore cannot be considered as a solution that may
achieve the objective of mandatory retraction.
It can be concluded that neither of the aforementioned
alternatives precludes the constitutionality of the proposal; the
chances of mandatory retraction to undo the reputational harm
caused by defamatory publications, as well as the extent to which it
could do it, are generally much higher than those of any other remedy
that has been thought of so far. Hence, the "least restrictive measure"
test is passed. The inquiry should focus now on the question of
whether the problems caused by mandatory retraction itself are
bearable from a constitutional perspective. The next subsections shall
therefore turn to examine the compatibility of the proposed

68

HASTINGS COMM/ENT LTJ

settlement with the rule against compelled speech and with the
principles of the constitutional protection of the press.
C.

Mandatory Retraction and the Rule Against Compelled Speech

1. Compelled Statement of Opinion and Compelled Statement of Fact
As indicated above, the Supreme Court has consistently
prohibited the compelling of individuals, groups, and institutions to
make expressions against their will. The question to be asked,
however, is whether all kinds of compelled speech should be treated
alike. Though the Court did not directly distinguish between various
forms of forced expression, an analysis of the relevant judicial
decisions leads to a negative answer of this question.
It goes without saying that forcing a person to state a certain
opinion is intolerable in a democratic regime. It seems axiomatic to
assert that the freedom to hold a belief, even without communicating
it to others, and to refrain from expressing opinions contrary to such
belief, is entitled to complete protection from state coercion. 3 7 And
indeed, recalling the cases referred to above in the second section, in
which an "obligation to speak" was deemed unconstitutional, most of
them concerned forced statements of belief. Compelling flag salute
and pledge,13 8 prohibiting the covering of an ideology statement
printed on license plates,139 obliging a company to publicize views
opposing to its own,' 4 and ordering parade organizers to alter the
overall message they intended to convey'
all involve forced
expression or dissemination of opinions or ideas.
Located at the interface between the freedom of expression and
the freedom of conscience, 42 the mentioned element took a
substantial role in the Court's reasoning. Thus, for example, it held in
Barnette that the flag salute regulation invaded "the sphere of
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to
our Constitution to reserve from all official control,"'43 and noted that
no government official may "force citizens to confess by word or act

137.
138.
139.
140.
141,
(1995).
142.
143.

See Emerson, supra note 92, at 919.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ.v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay. Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
Emerson, supra note 92, at 919.
W. Va. State Bd ofEduc., 319 U.S. at 642.
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their faith."' " Likewise, the Hurley Court stated that a state could not
compel affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees."5
Cases may be found, though, in which the Supreme Court
prohibited the compelling of speech regarding facts. Thus, the statute
invalidated in Riley required professional fundraisers to disclose to
potential donors the percentage of their gross receipts turned over to
charities,
and in McIntyre a statute proscribing distribution of
anonymous campaign literature was deemed unconstitutional.' The
Riley Court noted expressly that there is no ground to distinguish
compelled statements of opinion from compelled statements of fact,
as both clearly and substantially burden protected speech.' 8
However, one ought to be cautious before adopting this
approach in the context of defamation law.
First, in both of the mentioned cases, the facts whose utterance
was compelled by the statutes at bar related to the speaker himself,
and therefore, their exposure may be seen to violate the right to
privacy, be it personal or institutional. While this element was not
expressly discussed by the Court, it may have influenced its decisions.
An obligation to state facts relating to other people, as is the case in
retraction, seems less harmful.
Second, in Riley and McIntyre, the impact on the democratic
process of the information whose disclosure the states wished to
compel was rather weak and indirect. In Riley, the statutory objective
was to notify a relatively small group of people-potential donors-of
the policies of fundraisers, in order to enable them to make an
informed decision as to their charitable donations. In McIntyre, the
relevant information concerned the identity of authors of political
manifestos, whereas the much more crucial interest embedded in such
publications is their very being in the public domain. In contrast, the
interest of ensuring the flow of accurate facts about public figures in
order to shape a citizenry capable of effective self-governance is much
closer to the core of the First Amendment. The balance of interests in
our context therefore weighs more heavily towards validating the
compelled speech.
Third, in both cases the compelled speech was meant to serve
societal interests, whereas in our context there is also an individual

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.
Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
Riley, 487 U.S. at 797-98.
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right-the right of reputation-at stake; it is commonly asserted that
rights are entitled to stronger protection than interests.9 To sum up,
Justice Brennan's statement in Riley seems too sweeping; since it is
probably the particular facts of that case that were in his mind while
making that statement, it might be possible to construe it more
narrowly. In any case, the Court later made in Hurley a more modest
remark that may coincide with the approach portrayed here,
according to which the general rule against compelled speech applies
also to statements of fact "subject, perhaps, to the permissive law of
defamation.""15
Further support for this argument may be derived from several
Supreme Court decisions that did validate compelled speech. In
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,
upholding the right of the state to discipline attorneys for misleading
omissions in advertisements, the Court reasoned that there was no
attempt to force citizens to express a belief. 5 ' Furthermore, the Court
emphasized that the requirement was to include in the advertisement
"purely factual and uncontroversial information" about the terms
under which the services will be available.152 Though the speech at
stake there was commercial, the Court's holding could have some
relevance also in the context of political speech. One of the main
rationales given by the Supreme Court for the substantially weaker
protection granted to commercial expression relies not on the content
or motives of such speech, but rather on the fact that its truth is more
easily verifiable by its disseminator than news reporting or political
commentary. 53 The assumption underlying this analysis is that the
content of political speech is often disputable; but in the rare cases in
which it is not, it therefore becomes less distinct from commercial
expression. As explained below, within the present proposal the
compelled speech falls into this latter category.
In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, one of the major
rationalizations for upholding a Federal act obliging cable operators
to set aside channel space in order to carry the signals of local
broadcasters, was that given the nature of the cable service as a
conduit for broadcast signals, there is little risk that cable viewers

149. E.g., Emerson, supra note 92, at 920-21.
150. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573-74.
151. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
152.

Id.

153. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772
(1976).
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would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable system
convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator.'
Finally, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights,'55 the Supreme Court unanimously validated a statute denying
Federal funding to educational institutions which prevent the military
from gaining access to their campuses for purposes of military
recruiting in a manner that is at least equal to the access provided to
any other employer. The Court recognized that the equal treatment
demand could in fact oblige institutions to provide the military with
recruiting assistance which includes elements of speech, if other
employers receive such assistance, for instance, by sending e-mails or
posting notices on bulletin boards on the military's behalf. However,
the case was distinguished from the Barnette and Wooley type of
compelled speech. Among other arguments, the Court stated that
"[tihere is nothing in this case approaching a Government-mandated
pledge or motto that the school must endorse '' 51 6 and that "it
trivializes the freedom protected in Barnette and Wooley" to suggest
that it is harmed by the statute at bar.157 Chief Justice Roberts, writing
for the Court, emphasized that allowing recruitment by no means
indicates that the institutions agree with any speech by recruiters, and
that they remain free to disassociate themselves from any views
explicitly or implicitly expressed by the military. 5 8 Also worth noting
is the Court's remark that compelled statements of fact are "subject
to First Amendment scrutiny,"'5 9 which seems even softer than the
one mentioned above that was made by the Hurley Court.
It follows that the mere fact that speech of certain content was
compelled does not automatically make it unconstitutional in the
Supreme Court's view. It may further be inferred that under the
Court's approach, obliging a person to state uncontroversial facts or
communicate information in a manner that does not involve
affirmance of belief is much less offensive than compelled speech that
does concern an opinion or an idea, and therefore can be
constitutionally justified by sufficiently important interests.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994).
126 S.Ct. 1297 (2006).
Id. at 1308.
Id.
Id. at 1310. See also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
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Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 1308.
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2. Application to MandatoryRetraction
While considering how to apply the aforementioned concepts in
the context of mandatory retraction, first note that a belief may be
held not only concerning ideologies, but also with regard to facts. The
fact-opinion relations, which raise numerous problems within
defamation law that exceed the scope of this research, may be seen
less as a dichotomy and more as a spectrum. The location of every
statement on this spectrum depends on its level of potential
verifiability. There are many "grey areas" in which, though the
statement aims to depict an existing state of affairs and not merely to
offer a value judgment on the reality, this state of affairs is open to
dispute since no one can provide authoritative determination as to
what the true facts are. An inference from the analysis of some
ascertainable facts on the existence of additional facts may be seen as
a kind of opinion, as it is based not on the perception of the senses
but rather on the power of the intellect. Hence, obliging a person to
state a fact relating to a situation or occurrence whose nature is
disputable, which he believes to be untrue, may well infringe his
freedom of thought. However, the further one moves from the field
of ideas and opinions toward the realm of ascertainable facts, the less
relevance there is to his subjective conscience and beliefs.
This last insight could bear two alternative implications on our
discussion. The first possible route for constitutionalizing mandatory
retraction while avoiding infringement of the defendant's freedom of
belief, is requiring the plaintiff to meet an exceptionally high standard
of proof with regard to the falsity of the publication, as a precondition
for obliging the defendant to admit the falsity. The standard of proof
adopted by the majority of state and Federal courts in public
plaintiffs' libel claims, that of "clear and convincing evidence,"' '
would not suffice. The fact that the proof of falsity seems clear and
convincing to the court, does not necessarily mean that the defendant
is also convinced. There could be cases in which the latter would still
believe in the truth of his publication despite such judicial finding, be
it in light of evidence he cannot disclose, because he has an
unconventional way of thinking, or simply because the court has
erred. An obligation to admit the falsity of the publication in such a
case would be detrimental to his freedom of conscience. In order to

160. E.g., DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 115 (2d Cir. 2005); Buckley v. Littell, 539
F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976); Newman v. Delahunty, 681 A.2d 671, 674 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1994);

1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND

RELATED PROBLEMS §3.4 n.46 (3d ed. 2007).
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prevent this situation, a higher standard should be insisted upon:
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It may be assumed that objective
proof of falsity beyond reasonable doubt would provide decisive
evidence as to the publisher's state of mind; if there is no reasonable
way to consider the publication as true, presumably the publisher
himself would recognize its falsity. A statement acknowledging the
falsity in these circumstances would therefore be located at the very
end of the "factual" side of the fact-opinion continuum; it would be a
statement of pure fact which is essentially indisputable. Hence, an
obligation to retract would arguably bring about minimal damage to
the defendant's freedom of belief.
Yet, several significant difficulties arise. On the one hand, there
are very few cases in which the mentioned threshold would be met.
The response provided by the settlement to the societal need pointed
out above would therefore be partial and insufficient. On the other
hand, this approach might not always succeed in guaranteeing the
defendant's interests. It is not impossible to imagine a situation in
which, even though falsity is established, in the court's opinion,
beyond reasonable doubt, the publisher would still believe in good
faith that his report is accurate. Finally, the existence of two different
standards of proof, one for the damages action and the other for the
retraction suit, might yield practical problems and confusion among
juries.
For these reasons, another solution should be preferred. There is
something that no defendant can possibly claim to deny: it is the very
fact that a court found his publication to be false. An obligation to
publicize the indisputable fact that a judicial decision was issued
against the defendant would not infringe upon his freedom of belief.
The remedy to be adopted in order to vindicate the plaintiff's
reputation should therefore be a declaratory relief stating that the
falsity of the defamatory report has been properly proved,
accompanied by an order to report on the decision.
Several important clarifications as to the practicality of this
proposal need to be made:
1. In order to prevent subsequent disputes regarding the
implementation of the judicial order, the court may dictate the
wording of the compelled report. It ought to convey the
essence of the judicial holding as concisely as possible. It may
only relate to the falsity of the defamatory charges and not to
any other element, such as the defendant's misbehavior or the
plaintiff's good character.
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2. The substantive question of the falsity of the publication would
be adjudicated similarly to the way it is currently handled in
public figures' damages actions. First, since the defendant
would not be obliged to state the facts that have been proved
in trial as his own expression but only to report on the decision,
the standard of establishing falsity need not be exceptionally
high; the regular "clear and convincing evidence" requirement,
which is fairly demanding and hard to meet, could suffice.
Second, the principles of dealing with the complex fact-opinion
continuum within damages suits would be applicable. For
instance, it was held that a statement of opinion that does not
detail its underlying facts and might cause the audience to
reasonably believe it is based on undisclosed defamatory facts
could be regarded as a fact and subject its publisher to a
damages award; 6' it may therefore give rise also to a retraction
order. The same applies to a statement of opinion based on
disclosed facts that are themselves false and demeaning, which
may be punished with damages under the existing law.'62 Third,
the press would be entitled to the fair report privilege, whose
rationale is letting the public be informed of proceedings
conducted by the authorities and statements made by officials
regardless of their justification or merit.
3. The obligation to publicize the judicial finding of falsity by no
means prohibits the publisher from insisting that his
publication is true, and from explaining to his audience why he
was not able to prove that allegation (for example, due to
inability to expose his sources) or why the court has erred.
4. On the other hand, the fact that the publisher may only be
obliged, consistent with the First Amendment, to report on the
content of the verdict, does not preclude the possibility of
publishing a retraction in its usual meaning if he chooses to do
so following the injunction. A publisher's initial refusal to
retract does not necessarily stem from a factual disagreement
with the defamed person; the reason for it might be his
contention that the falsehood does not relate to the "sting" of

161. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1977).

162. Standing Comm. on Discipline of the United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist.
of Cal. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 566, cmt. c.
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the publication. 63 The court's finding that the publication is
false embodies a determination that the falsity is substantial
and thus denies such assertion. In that case, if the defendant
recognizes that the relevant facts are indeed untrue, he can
simply state that rather than cite the verdict. Once again, he is
not prevented from including his own input in the report, this
time by asserting that the falsity is immaterial to the
publication as a whole. Nevertheless, the retraction in such a
case should be explicit rather than equivocal or hesitant, and it
must expressly state that the reported facts have turned out to
be false.'6
D. Mandatory Retraction and New York Times v. Sullivan

1. General
Settling the retraction remedy with the rule against compelled
speech does not suffice in order to constitutionalize it. For that task to
be completed, the First Amendment issues arising from the special
status of the press, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Sullivan
and in subsequent decisions, need to be discussed. As explained
below, the settlement described above strikes a proper balance
between the conflicting considerations at stake.
Society has an interest that opposing points of view on public
affairs be circulated not only concerning ideas and beliefs, but also
with regard to facts, whose very existence or nature is often
disputable and open to different interpretations and evaluations.
Indeed, precisely in the "grey areas" of uncertainty, an investigative
press is of the greatest importance. The facts relating to the most
outrageous corruption and scandals are often shrouded in doubts,
especially at the stages of the initial investigation and report.
Journalistic analysis and hypothesis, which are often inherently
speculative, must be encouraged, as they may lead to the exposure of
the truth. Thus, even claims made by the media whose probability of
being accurate falls below the preponderance of the evidence-the
usual standard of proof in civil litigation-ought to be heard and

163. According to Mr. George Freeman, the Assistant General Counsel of The New
York Times Company, in many of the cases in which victims of defamation contend that
the publications on them are false, the inaccuracies-from the newspapers' perspectiverelate to minor details and not to the core of the defamatory charges. George Freeman,
Assistant Gen. Counsel of The N.Y. Times Co., N.Y.U. School of Law Debate: Freedom
of the Pressor License to Libel (Nov. 16, 2005).
164. Cf. 2 SMOLLA, supra note 1, § 9:81, at 9-51.
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should not be punished. Most courts handling libel damages suits
therefore require, as aforementioned, a "clear and convincing
evidence" standard of proof for falsity, in order to resolve doubts in
favor of speech when the truth of a statement is difficult to ascertain
conclusively. 165

This principle is also applicable to mandatory retraction. An
authoritative judicial determination as to the falsity of a factual claim,
followed by the publisher's statement that he withdraws it, would, in
effect, remove it from the public discourse. Moreover, even if the
compelled publication would only include a report on the issuance of
the verdict and not an actual withdrawal, the status of the defendant's
point of view in the marketplace of ideas would be diminished. So
long as the probability that that statement is true is not utterly
negligible, such an outcome could be detrimental to the value of
maintaining an "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" public debate, in
which different points of view are to be given an equal opportunity to
compete. Even if assertions of fact whose probability falls below a
certain level may be treated differently, a probability of slightly less
than 50 percent cannot be the threshold. The risk of erroneous
findings of falsity is real if the plaintiff's burden of proof is not
demanding enough. The outcome in such cases, especially if the
judicial finding is to be publicized in one way or another, might be the
perpetuation of falsehoods in the public domain, which would
frustrate the very objective of a vindication remedy.
That consideration, however, loses its weight when the
probability that the relevant factual contention is true is particularly
low. Under the existing law, proof of falsity by clear and convincing
evidence renders a publication insufficiently valuable for the
marketplace of ideas, and exposes its publisher to immense monetary
liability provided that actual malice is found. The same rationale may
apply to our context and legitimize a judicial finding of falsity
accompanied by an injunctive relief ordering the
166 defendant to report
it, when the falsity is proved in such a manner.
It should be emphasized that even if falsity is established
according to the mentioned standard and an injunctive relief is
granted, the defendant's hypothesis would not necessarily be
removed from the public discourse. The effect of the remedy would
be less dramatic; it would merely function as a significant caveat with
165. Robertson v. McCloskey, 666 F. Supp. 241,248 (D.D.C. 1987).
166. Similarly, some of the declaratory judgment proposals required that falsity be
established by clear and convincing proof. Franklin, supra note 110, at 813; THE
ANNENBERG PROPOSAL, supra note 6, Section 4(d).
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regard to the publication, thus bettering the plaintiff's public image
that was harmed. As noted above, after informing his audience of the
judicial determination, the defendant may insist that his initial report
is nevertheless accurate. In this way, the interests of both parties
would be protected; while ordinary people tend to attribute
importance to judicial decisions and to consider them reliable, they
presumably recognize that judges, let alone juries, might err, and
could be persuaded that that in fact happened in a given case.
The interest of warning the public regarding assertions of fact
whose falsity is so proved is most important when the subjects of such
publications are public figures. Imposing the proposed rule may be
viewed as complementing the Sullivan rule itself, as both are designed
to guarantee that the public be adequately informed of public affairs.
Initially, it is the defendant's interest to bring his case under Sullivan
by asserting that he belongs to the media and that the plaintiff is a
public figure. Such a claim, if accepted, provides the former with an
immense procedural advantage. It seems appropriate to attach to it
another corollary, namely, the application of the retraction rule when
its conditions are met.
2.

Actual Malice?

Despite having concluded that compelled publication of judicial
findings of falsity under the discussed circumstances would, in
principle, serve the public good, one has to address a more practical,
yet constitutionally crucial question, that is, whether the imposition of
such a duty must be contingent on showing of actual malice. Judge
Pollak's notion as to constitutionalizing mandatory retraction, 67 as
well as a proposal raised-and rejected-by Smolla, s requires, as a
prerequisite for recognizing that obligation, that the plaintiff meet the
Sullivan standard. However, this condition should not be insisted
upon in our context.
To begin with, in a certain sense the publisher's malice serves
within the Sullivan rule as a moral justification for exposing him to
financial sanctions. This justification is formulated to a large extent
from the perspective of the balance of equities between the parties. In
contrast, the retraction remedy is designed first and foremost to
correct falsehoods and to reveal the truth, and not to serve as a
penalty. Viewed this way, -the societal need for retraction is not

167.
1988).
168.

Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. and Cable, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 483,489 (E.D. Pa.
2

SMOLLA,

supra note 1, § 9:92 at 9-64.
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influenced by, and therefore should not be dependent on, the
defendant's state of mind.
More importantly, the absence of the malice standard in the
proposed settlement does not stand in contradiction to the main
underlying rationale of Sullivan. Indeed, it may well be argued that
the Sullivan Court itself, which expressed a liberal approach clearly
favoring the freedom of the press over the right to reputation, would
not have approved of this proposal. Yet, it seems that the focus of the
analysis should be less on the spirit of that ruling and more on its
holding. In order to determine the implications of the Sullivan line of
decisions, one needs to define precisely the danger or dangers from
which the Court wished to protect the press, and the manner in which
it intended to protect it.
Sullivan's opening sentence 69 and the Court's subsequent
analysis make it clear that this ruling was essentially designed to
protect free debate from the stifling threat of outsized money
awards.'
A similar rationale, along with the actual malice
requirement, was applied in a later decision to criminal sanctions for
"'
libel which, in the Court's view, produce a significant chilling effect.17
The Court's major concern, hence, was not the mere recognition of
liability, but rather the financial or criminal consequences attached to
it; 172 and it did not say, in either case, what rules it would impose on
imaginative alternatives to these remedies.'73 The proposed retraction
remedy, in contrast, involves neither money liability nor criminal
penalty and therefore, on its face, it is not subject automatically to the
Sullivan analysis.
Indeed, this proposal is expected to have non-damages
consequences on the press. However, in view of the following analysis
of these consequences, the self-censorial impact of having to retract
does not come near that of the threat of an enormous damages
award 74 or criminal liability. This analysis will take into consideration,
169. "We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which
the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages
in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct" New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 277-78.
171. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
172. See, Erwin, supra note 78, at 711; Franklin, supra note 110, at 820; Hulme, supra
note 3, at 393; Leval, supra note 5, at 1288-90; Douglas R. Matthews, American
Defamation Law: From Sullivan, Through Greenmoss, and Beyond, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 513,
530 (1987); Vindicationof Reputation, supra note 6, at 1745.
173. Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 78, at 61.
174. See Vindication of Reputation,supra note 6, at 1742.
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as one of its guiding principles, a statement made by the Pacific Gas
dissenting opinion: when the chilling effect can be regarded as more
"remote and speculative" than "immediate and direct," it should not
be subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny.' 5 Though, as
aforementioned, the standard of scrutiny in our context is strict
scrutiny, and regardless of the propriety of the outcome reached by
Justice Rehnquist in that particular case, the approach that the
chilling effect of any statute should be looked at as a question of
degree, seems in place. 76 Since the protection of speech invariably
harms competing interests, it is undesirable to prefer the value of free
speech while scarifying those other interests whenever there is a
speculative risk of a negligible chill.
Bearing this principle in mind, the following discussion will
explain the aforementioned assertion while referring to various
possible impacts of the proposed retraction remedy.
3.

Possible Implications:Interference with the EditorialAutonomy

The instant effect of mandatory retraction concerns the core
element of the editorial autonomy that the Supreme Court has been
determined to protect, namely, the right of the media to express value
judgments through control on the selection of material to be
conveyed to the public. However, several factors make this harm
insignificant.
First, as noted more than once, while reporting on the verdict it
may well be possible for the publisher to argue against the judicial
finding, and, a fortiori, to insist on the persuasiveness of his opinion
on the subject of the report or to express his ideology in the general
context of the relevant events. Hence, the proposed legal remedy may
not give rise to an argument that the press is forced to act against its
conscience or that it is prevented from performing its "fourth branch"
role.
Second, in contrast to Powe's assumption cited above, that
replies (and similarly, retractions) will necessitate the omission of
entire stories,177 compromises may be made. Thus, the publisher may
report some of his stories slightly less lengthily than he had intended
to.

175. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 30 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. POWE, supra note 32, at 276.
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Third, the items that would be cut out or shortened will
necessarily be the least important ones in the publisher'sjudgment. It
should also be noted that the publisher had already expressed his
view that subject matter of the compelled publication is important
and newsworthy enough by initially deciding to report on the very
same issue.'78
Fourth, in most cases, the retraction is not likely to be long (in a
newspaper or a website, in terms of words, and in television or radio
in terms of time), since it is supposed to consist of mainly the
mentioning -of the verdict. Even in case the publisher wishes to
confront the decision, the article would probably be composed of
mainly a brief repeat of previous reports or analysis.
Fifth, the interference with the editorial judgment would
probably be very infrequent. Many of the reports published by the
press belong to those "grey areas" of uncertainty; even if they seem
false, it cannot be established by clear and convincing evidence. In all
of these cases, raising modest support for the accuracy of the
publication would suffice in order for the defendant to evade the
retraction remedy. It may also be assumed that those publications
that do concern ascertainable facts are often correct, since most
journalists presumably do not fail to double check reports whose
accuracy is easily verifiable. Hence, there will be relatively few cases
in which the high standard of proving falsity will be passed.
Finally, the quantity of compelled retractions is expected to be
even lower than the number of clearly-false reports. A view claiming
that any false report would expose its publisher to interference with
his editorial autonomy in the form of mandatory retraction, suggests
that publishers never or seldom retract false defamatory publications
voluntarily. Hopefully, at least, this is not true. The proposed
settlement would affect the editorial autonomy in those cases where,
for one reason or another, the publisher chooses not to retract
voluntarily, which presumably cover only a portion of the cases in
which defamatory reports turn out to be false.
It follows from the preceding analysis that the significantly vast
portion of the editorial autonomy would remain intact. While it
would be subject to "technical" interferences, which are likely to be
insignificant and infrequent, the substantive element of this concept,
that concerns the ability of the press to be an independent player in
the political sphere, would not be harmed at all. In this context, there
are good reasons to disagree with Powe's "slippery slope"
178. See BEZANSON, supra note 31, at 79.

2007] CONSTITUTIONALIZING MANDATORY RETRACTION IN DEFAMATION LAW

81

terminology, as reflected by his contention that any recognition in
compelled publications in a single context would open the door to
additional ones.'79 The editorial autonomy is not and cannot be utterly
absolute; what is the Sullivan rule if not a restriction on the way in
which the editorial autonomy in news gathering and reporting should
be exercised? Arguably, each and every restriction put on the
freedom of the press to publish what it wants to and to act in the way
it wishes, be it for reasons relating to defamation law, antitrust law,
copyright law, national security, equal protection and so forth,'"°
might potentially lead to additional, more severe governmental
interventions. However, the mentioned legal doctrines as well as
other ones do indeed mandate the imposition of certain restrictions
on the press, some of which are content-based. The way to prevent a
"slippery slope" is to subject those restrictions to narrow and clear
statutory definitions and to strict judicial oversight. Accordingly, the
characteristics of this article's proposal detailed above are designed to
meet these conditions.
4.

PossibleImplications:AdditionalNon-Damages Costs

Even in the absence of damages, the proposed mandatory
retraction rule might bring about some financial costs to publishers.
One concern might be that the litigation expenses would in fact
constitute a sanction. Furthermore-and perhaps more importantlythe fear of these costs would arguably drive publishers to retract in
order to avoid litigation, even when it is not justified.
However, the cost of litigation is not expected to be so high as to
encourage unnecessary retractions. The high litigation expenses that
often characterize defamation suits are attributable, to a large extent,
to the evidential and procedural consequences of the actual malice
rule, which requires a thorough scrutiny of the editorial newsgathering process and decision-making.' Since this factor does not
exist in a procedure designed merely to examine the truth of the
publication, the litigation expenses are likely to be much lower.'
Though the said question is not always simple, it is an objective one,

POWE, supra note 32, at 277, 283.
BEZANSON, supra note 31, at 75-76.
181. Anderson, supra note 78, at 511, 516; Robert . Berdon, Commentary: Freedom of
the Press and the Connecticut Constitution, 26 CONN. L. REV. 659, 661 (1994); David A.
Logan, Tort Law and the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 51 U. PITr. L. REV.
493, n.414 (1990); Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases:
The Impact of the FirstAmendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 215, 238 (1987).
182. See Hulme, supra note 3, at 408.
179.

180. See
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and as such it is invariably much easier to handle than determining a
party's state of mind. It should also be noted that under the proposal,
the defendant would not be obliged to pay the plaintiff her attorney's
fees in case the latter prevails; 8 3 the costs incurred by such a
settlement might excessively deter the press from litigating."
Therefore, the consequences of failure to retract voluntarily would be
confined to an obligation to perform a rather similar action,
supplemented by the publisher's own litigation costs which are
unlikely to constitute a deterring factor.
Indeed, the embarrassment caused by a court-compelled
publication is greater than it is in the case of a voluntary retraction.
However, given the fact that publishers are usually reluctant to
retract, s5 this factor alone does not appear to be significant enough in
order to incentivize unjustified voluntary retractions. Moreover, as
aforementioned, the defendant would be able to opt for a "regular"
retraction without mentioning that the falsehood was established by a
court; this latter fact is not of such public importance that necessitates
its compelled publication, provided that the public is informed of the
falsity itself.
Another assertion of the Tornillo Court as to a harm caused by
compelled publications-the economic cost of publishing a retraction
or a reply16-has been described as unconvincing. 17 Given the

financial strength that generally characterizes the media, so it was
contended, the cost of space or broadcast time to publish the

retraction does not present the defendant with an overwhelming
183. Cf. Hulme, supra note 3, at 411-13; THE ANNENBERG PROPOSAL, supra note 6,
Section 10(b).
184. Arguably, absent a fee-shifting provision, many potential plaintiffs might refrain
from suing for a non-damages remedy since it would cause them financial losses. However,
several factors make that concern less troublesome. First,the litigation is likely to be much
less costly than it is presently also for plaintiffs. See Ingber, Defamation,supra note 110, at
855. Second, very often public figure plaintiffs, who are the subject of our discussion, do
not have to pay attorney's fee, as the financing comes from their private interest
supporters. Barrett, supra note 78, at 859; Leval, supra note 5, at 1293. Third, many
lawyers handle public figure libel cases driven mainly by motives of either publicity for
themselves or loyalty to the plaintiff. This may be indicated by their willingness to
represent these clients on a contingent fee basis despite their low chance of recovering
damages in light of Sullivan. Leval, supra note 5, at 1293-94. Hence, certain lawyers might
agree to take such cases free of charge when a damages relief is not sought at all. Fourth,
as explained below, when actual malice is established, the retraction remedy would be
applicable in addition to, and not instead of, damages. In such a case, the litigation costs
would be covered by the damages award.
185. Leval, supra note 5, at 1298.
186. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,256 (1974).
187. 1973 Term, supra note 24, at 178.
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burden. 8 This is especially true within the present proposal in light of
the expected low frequency of retractions and their being relatively
short. Indeed, the smaller the publisher, the more limited his
resources.18 9 However, since the size invariably diminishes the scope
of the investigative reports and their depth, the quantity of the
retraction demands and the resources required for their performance
are also likely to be lower with regard to small media.
It should also be noted that if Powe's contention that retractions
and replies deprive the public of newsworthy material"9 is correct,
then they would probably cause less financial costs, if at all. The
underlying assumption of Powe's argument is that the space or
broadcast time for the compelled publication would not be created by
adding pages, extending the length of the broadcast or foregoing
advertisements, but rather by cutting out or shortening other stories.
No direct financial effect would thus occur. It could still be argued
that the profitability of the publication would decrease also in this
case, due to the diminished attractiveness of its contents, but such an
effect is likely to be highly indirect and insubstantial. The sales of a
newspaper on a given day or the rating of a specific newscast would
not be harmed even if they contain a retraction at the expense of
other materials, since the consumers would not know, particularly
before they decide to purchase the newspaper or to watch the
newscast, how they would have looked but for the retraction. As for
the long run, since, as aforementioned, the aggregate quantity of
retractions is likely to be low, no identifiable influence on the overall
marketability of publications may be expected.
Finally, in some respects, the press could even be economically
advantaged by the proposed settlement. According to the often-cited
Iowa Libel Research Project, many libel plaintiffs, particularly public
figures, bring suits driven by the desire to obtain vindication and not
to recover monetary damages."' Many plaintiffs are therefore likely
to opt for the retraction remedy while foregoing their claim for
damages, in which their chances of prevailing are extremely low.
Even when the plaintiff is of the opinion that proving the defendant's
actual malice is within her reach, the uncertainty of the outcome
could induce her to avoid the risk of incurring the immense litigation
costs. The publishers would thus be spared their own high litigation
188. Martin, supra note 73, at 310.
189. POWE, supra note 32, at 274.
190. Id. at 276.
191. Randall P. Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Litigation: Setting the Record
Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226, 227 (1985) [hereinafter Bezanson, Libel Law].
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expenses
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(in addition to the inconvenient scrutiny into their

investigative and editorial processes they must undergo under
Sullivan1"). Furthermore, in those cases where actual malice is indeed
provable, the defendant would be saved from enormous monetary
liability and from much greater embarrassment stemming from a
finding of flawed professional conduct.
5.

PossibleImplications: Long-Term Chilling Effect

While most effects discussed so far constitute the immediate
result caused by mandatory retraction in a given case, the issue that
concerned the Sullivan Court the most was the long-term impact of
libel liability on the behavior of the press. At the center of the chilling
effect doctrine is the interest of enhancing journalistic reports in
situations of uncertainty. Arguably, a mandatory retraction rule
would deter the media from reporting controversial facts, because
such reports might expose them to a duty to retract should those
reports turn out to be false. However, if the frequency of mandatory
retractions would indeed be low and the immediate damage caused
by them would indeed be negligible, as explained above, that fear it is
not likely to play a major role in the editorial discretion.
The assertion regarding the lack of a significant chilling effect is
not changed by the fact that a retraction may embarrass the
publisher.9 Media outlets that are committed to investigative
journalism-to whom the chilling effect discourse essentially
relates-are unlikely to refrain from reporting on controversial issues
out of considerations of possible harm to their reputation, since it is
exactly these reports that create their reputation. Furthermore, the
fear of retractions is unlikely to constitute an excessively deterring
factor since sporadic retractions presumably do not affect a
publisher's market success." Since the public knows that errors are
inevitable in the course of journalistic work, its appreciation of a
publisher would not be lowered following a retraction. Lack of
retractions on the part of a publisher is not likely to make the public
believe it is immune from mistakes, but rather that it does not have
sufficient integrity to admit them.9 Indeed, an abundance of
192. Leval, supra note 5, at 1294.
193. Martin, supra note 73, at 303.
194. Id. at 310-11.
195. See Martin, supra note 73, at 311. A view that retractions of erroneous
publications serve the public image of the media was expressed by Mr. George Freeman,
the Assistant General Counsel of The New York Times Company, within the "Freedom of
the Press or License to Libel" debate. Freeman, supra note 163.
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retractions on the part of a certain publisher may well harm its
credibility; but if that publisher systematically disseminates reports
whose falsity is ultimately proved by clear and convincing evidence,
his loss of credibility is fairly justified.
Also the fear of frivolous suits would probably be an insignificant
factor in the press' decision-making. First, in light of the "clear and
convincing proof" requirement, the plaintiff's position in the playing
field would be inferior,' 96 and therefore defamed people would not
hasten to bring groundless actions. Second, the conditions before
Sullivan, when plaintiffs could bring libel suits free of the
constitutional obstacle and recover money damages, did not produce
floods of frivolous libel litigation; hence, there is no reason to suppose
there would be floods of suits for declaratory judgments which do not
make plaintiffs eligible for any compensation. 97 Third, and most
importantly, the very essence of the declaratory relief procedure
provides a substantial disincentive for frivolous suits, which does not
exist under the current system. Since the question of the truth or
falsity of the publication is nowadays rarely addressed,9 plaintiffs can
file suits and then blame their failure to recover on the actual malice
requirement. Hence, people who have been rightfully defamed, such
as organized crime figures or corrupt politicians, and who do not fear
the financial consequences of the litigation, might be interested in
seeking partial vindication by the mere act of suing the media,
without bearing the risk of a judgment confirming the truth of the
charges against them. In contrast, a person who knows that the
defamation published about her is accurate can only lose from filing a
frivolous action for a declaratory judgment, in which it will ultimately
be held expressly that she failed to prove the falsity of the
publication.9
To sum up, the proposed settlement does not raise a serious
concern of a chilling effect, since publishers would know that their
probability of having to retract is low and that the financial and nonfinancial costs incurred by such an obligation, should it be imposed,
are likely to be insignificant. Furthermore, the harm caused, if there is
any, could be balanced or mitigated by other factors. Hence, the least
that can be said is that this proposal would not yield a concrete,
ascertainable disadvantage to the media which would deter them
196. Smolla & Gaertner, supra note 78, at 51.
197. See Leval, supra note 5, at 1297.
198. Bezanson, Libel Law, supra note 191, at 227.
199. Barrett, supra note 78, at 862-63; Franklin, supra note 110, at 826-27; Smolla &
Gaertner, supra note 78, at 53. See also Bezanson, Libel Law, supra note 191, at 230-31.
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from reporting on disputable facts in the first place, any more than
they are deterred now. If there remains any chill at all it would be
negligible, and would be outweighed by the significant societal
interests that the mandatory retraction rule is designed to enhance.
6. Mandatory Retraction When Actual Malice is Established
While the need for mandatory retraction, viewed from the
perspective of the plaintiff's individual right of reputation, seems less
acute in those rare cases in which damages are awarded, it is still
necessitated by the compelling societal interest in promoting efficient
self governance. Even when money damages are awarded, in many
cases the judgment alone will not draw sufficient public notice.2°° With
the absence of wide publication, the falsehood will persist in the
public mind. Due to the immeasurable importance of enabling the
citizens to make intelligent decisions based on widespread, abundant
and accurate information concerning public affairs and public figures,
society's interest in correcting defamatory misstatements about such
matters extends beyond the desire to provide relief to aggrieved
individuals."' "Once a defamatory falsehood has been published, the
public official's reputation is restored only if those to whom the
defamation was uttered are informed of the statement's falsity." 2"
Therefore, it is appropriate to supplement the damages that the
defendant would have to pay in such a case with an obligation to
retract.
Examining the considerations pertinent to the defendant leads to
a similar conclusion. The justification for imposing the mandatory
retraction rule on publishers who act with actual malice follows a
fortiori from the analysis of the cases in which they do not. It should
first be noted that the effect of the compelled retraction would
probably be negligible in comparison with the monetary liability
imposed on the defendant in such a situation. But even if it is not
negligible, it is still legitimate according to Sullivan. The moral and
ethical flaw of such behavior on the part of the publisher is so severe,
that there is no reason not to expose him to both remedies. As the
Supreme Court indicated, punishing publishers for circulating false
defamatory reports while being indifferent to the truth does not
amount to a chilling effect prohibited by the First Amendment. The
Court noted that "[c]alculated falsehood falls into that class of

200. Ingber, Intangible Injuries, supra note 3, at 834.
201. Vindication of Reputation,supra note 6, at 1730-31.
202. Id. at 1739.
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utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest
20 3
in order and morality.'
The aforementioned moral considerations also deny the option
of exempting the defendant from the monetary sanction when a
retraction is ordered. An additional, practical argument could be
raised in support of that position. Making the damages and the
retraction remedies cumulative rather than alternative might further
reduce the risk of frivolous suits by "guilty plaintiffs." In case the
remedies are alternative, such plaintiffs would be able to insist that
they prefer monetary compensation over actual vindication, thereby
evading judicial examination of the truth of the charges against them
and blaming Sullivan for their defeat. In contrast, if the remedies may
be granted cumulatively, suing for damages while foregoing the
retraction action could be interpreted by the public as "pleading
guilty," and since the retraction action would be very undesirable for
"guilty plaintiffs," they might refrain from suing altogether.
Finally, it should be noted that though it would certainly
constitute bad journalism to report on the finding of falsity while
failing to mention the financial sanction imposed on the publisher,
only the finding should be the subject of the mandatory publication.
The reason is that the decisive factor giving rise to the monetary
liability-the defendant's actual malice-is not a matter of public
interest whose publication is necessary to further an important public
objective.
VI. Conclusion
The publication of false defamatory statements relating to public
figures, which is normally not recoverable under American libel law,
causes severe harm to the victims' right to reputation and to the
societal interest of shaping an informed citizenry capable of effective
self-governance. Once a publisher becomes aware that a defamatory
report previously made by him is false, the right thing for him to do,
professionally, ethically and morally, is to inform his audience of the
mistake. Hopefully, most media do so. However, since the values that
a publisher might harm by choosing not to retract are so crucial,
society is not bound to leave this decision to his discretion. Rather, it
may recognize a norm obliging him to undo the damage, provided
203. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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that it affects to the smallest extent possible the media's freedom
from compelled speech and their editorial autonomy.
This article portrays a legal settlement that could meet the said
demands. It asserts that a state statute authorizing courts to issue a
declaratory judgment, stating that a defamatory publication has been
proved as false by clear and convincing evidence, accompanied by an
injunctive relief ordering the defendant to report on that verdict, may
be deemed constitutional. The proposed settlement is likely to cause
publishers negligible harm at the most, and could even serve their
interests in some ways. A final remark that can be added is that also
the press in general might benefit from this proposal. Because truth
has become almost irrelevant in libel actions, the credibility of the
press has arguably decreased, since the American public has no way
of discerning whether news stories that become subjects of libel suits
are true or false.2" A shift in the focus of the judicial process toward
an examination of the truthfulness of libelous publications could help
to convince the public that most of the journalistic reports are true.
Furthermore, the proposal is likely to induce the media to retract
voluntarily more often and more prominently than they do today,
upon recognizing that the publication at stake has clearly turned out
to be false. A press that consistently admits its own mistakes and
shows devotion in carrying out its mission of keeping the citizens
informed and updated might gain greater public faith, and thus be
able to perform its constitutional role more successfully. 5 If the norm
of retraction is rooted throughout the journalistic profession and
accepted as a trivial standard of conduct, many journalists would be
surprised to find that sorry is not such a hard word after all.
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